ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00001.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper offers an exact definition of the value created by firms together with their suppliers and buyers. The “added value” of a firm is similarly defined, and shown under certain conditions to impose an upper bound on how much value the firm can capture. The key to a firm's achieving a positive added value is the existence of asymmetries between the firm and other firms. The paper identifies four routes (“value‐based” strategies) that lead to the creation of such asymmetries. Our analysis reveals the equal importance of a firm's supplier and buyer relations. Cooperative game theory provides the underpinnings of the

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00005.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper attacks the problem of developing strategies for a firm to deal with technological change. We show that the product market strategies of the firm—including pricing, product positioning, and rent preemption strategies—can play a role in the efficient search for technology‐related information when information search is costly and there are adaptation costs due to the presence of agency. We utilize a dynamic model of spatial competition with uncertain technological innovations in which firms can learn from each other about technological developments. Private information and agency conflicts are shown to increase the effective information search costs of incumbents, who then use interfirm learning to their advantage in equilibrium. This viewpoint also allows us to see the role of mergers and acquisitions, subsidiary formation, and internalR&Dlabs in a new light. The more general point is that organizational structures and, in particular, the differential distribution of information within the organization impose constraints on the information‐search and adaptation strategies of the firm, and the formulation of product‐market andR&Dstrategies serves to relax these co

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00025.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The recent emergence of total quality management (TQM) in the U.S. has spawned a great deal of interest in management circles as well as in the mass media. However, despite the growing number of firms that have adopted this management technique, few formal tests exist concerning the pattern of adoption as well as the changes that accompany the adoption of TQM. This paper contrasts models of production for TQM and non‐TQM firms in order to explore reasons why some firms but not others have adopted the TQM approach to quality improvement. Predictions arising from such a comparison are tested using a unique data set that combines data on firms from three different sources. Our findings tend to support the proposed theory of systematic differences between firms that find it advantageous to adopt TQM and firms that do not. We also find evidence that firms adopting TQM experience greater growth in sales, employment, and capital stoc

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00069.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper develops the hypothesis that firms possess a stock of well‐established brands, a stock termed brand capital. The firm with the greatest capital is able to introduce new products in response to new information about consumer tastes before rivals. The results using data from the ready‐to‐eat cereal industry not only support this hypothesis, but also distinguish brand capital from other sources of firm heteroge

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00107.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Duopolistic interaction between a small firm and a large established firm is considered and compared to guerrilla warfare, The paper investigates a “hit and run” equilibrium in which the small firm enters the market, stays there for several periods, exits, stays out for several periods, and then reenters. Occasionally there may be a price war (or retaliation), but the small firm may also exit voluntarily, thereby avoiding possible confrontation. The amount of time that the small firm stays in the market and the timing of the price wars do not follow any predictable pattern, which is part of the mixed strategies that both firms play in equilibr

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00131.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY