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1. |
INTRODUCTION |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 5,
Issue 1,
1983,
Page 3-8
KEITH HAWKINS,
JOHN M. THOMAS,
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PDF (243KB)
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ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1983.tb00287.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1983
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
“TOO MANY LAWYERS, NOT ENOUGH PRACTICAL PEOPLE”: The Policy‐Making Discretion of the Federal Trade Commission |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 5,
Issue 1,
1983,
Page 9-34
BARRY B. BOYER,
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PDF (1065KB)
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摘要:
Contemporary legal theory recognizes three primary methods of controling administrative discretion: confining through substantive standards, structuring through procedural requirements, and checking through bureaucratic review. It is sometimes assumed that these techniques operate independently and that their effects are additive. This article reports on a study of Federal Trade Commission policy‐making and concludes that in some instances there can be complex interactions among the legal techniques for controlling discretion, and between the legal techniques and political or bureaucratic forces shaping policy‐making discret
ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1983.tb00288.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1983
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
BARGAIN AND BLUFF: Compliance Strategy and Deterrence in the Enforcement of Regulation |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 5,
Issue 1,
1983,
Page 35-73
KEITH HAWKINS,
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PDF (1607KB)
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摘要:
A strategy of compliance in which enforcement agents rely on negotiation is identified as a characteristic feature of water pollution control work. The strategy arises from the nature of the conduct and activities subject to regulation and from the need to maintain a continuing relationship with the regulated. In securing compliance regulatory agents shape their enforcement tactics by reference to assumptions held as to why polluters fail to comply. Bargaining is central to compliance strategy, but if a conciliatory approach fails, a more threatening posture will be taken in which a variety of mores, including bluffs about legal sanctions, may be employed. Law enforcement is treated as a matter of compliance as well as compulsion.
ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1983.tb00289.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1983
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT: An Economic Study of the British Factory Inspectorate |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 5,
Issue 1,
1983,
Page 75-96
CENTO G. VELJANOVSKI,
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PDF (882KB)
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摘要:
The British Factory Inspectorate is the body responsible for enforcing occupational health and safety legislation in the manufacturing industries. The concept of economic efficiency is used to link the compartmentalized disciplines involved in regulation. Many enforcement practices in social regulation can be seen as attempts to minimize social costs of disobeying regulations subject to institutional, political, and budgetary constraints.
ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1983.tb00290.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1983
数据来源: WILEY
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5. |
REMEDIES UNDER CONTRACT LAW: Designing Rules to Facilitate Out‐of‐Court Settlements |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 5,
Issue 1,
1983,
Page 97-127
D. R. HARRIS,
CENTO G. VELJANOVSKI,
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PDF (1276KB)
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摘要:
The law of contract is analyzed in economic terms, focusing on the influence of formal rules in contract disputes. An argument is presented for the utility of designing rules with an understanding of their impact on the relative regulating strength of the parties seeking to bargain out of court. Several reasons are identified for suggesting that unless designed for such out‐of‐court negotiations formal rules need to be different from those suitable for the resolution of contract disputes in the cou
ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1983.tb00291.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1983
数据来源: WILEY
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6. |
ADMINISTERING LABOR CONTRACTS USING TRANSACTION‐COSTS ECONOMICS |
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Law&Policy,
Volume 5,
Issue 1,
1983,
Page 129-152
KENNETH VOGEL,
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PDF (973KB)
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摘要:
Labor contracts are rules of governance between workers and employers over time. The efficiency of the transaction and the relationship can be affected by the provisions of the contract. It is argued that the characteristics of the firm and the workers determine what kinds of contracts and governance of the provisions of contracts are most efficient. Among other results, it is argued that collective bargaining, together with grievance procedures and arbitration, is the most efficient form of labor contracting and governance for large firms with skilled work forces.
ISSN:0265-8240
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1983.tb00292.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1983
数据来源: WILEY
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