摘要:

This introduction examines the global legislative process as it applies to environmental agreements. It argues that this process should be seen as consisting of at least two phases. Phase one seeks to create a broad legislative framework designed to facilitate debate emanating from three different perspectives: science, equity, and economics. Phase one also seeks to attract as many countries as possible to the negotiating process. Phase two then tries to reconcile at least some of the conflicts inherent in these three different starting points.

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00091.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), formally begins a process for countries jointly to limit the long‐term risk of climate change. The near‐term effectiveness of the Framework Convention will be limited, due to ambiguities in language, uncertainties regarding the magnitude and location of sources and sinks, the difference between biological and industrial emissions, uncertainty about the relative importance of the various greenhouse gases and selection of a weighting system, and concerns about equity. Action in the near term will likely cover either CO2alone or just those gases resulting from the use of fossil fuels in the industrialized world. Based on this limitation, it is projected that by 2036 the earth will be committed to a 2.2oC temperature increase. The effectiveness of the Convention need not be as limited as this analysis suggests; it is an evolving document, tailored to be flexible and to respond to the most recent scientific knowle

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00092.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In order to decide whether a comprehensive treaty covering all greenhouse gases is the best next step after UNCED, one needs to distinguish among the four questions about the international justice of such international arrangements: (1) What is a fair allocation of the costs of preventing the global warming that is still avoidable?; (2) What is a fair allocation of the costs of coping with the social consequences of the global warming that will not in fact be avoided?; (3) What background allocation of wealth would allow international bargaining (about issues like 1 and 2) to be a fair process?; and (4) What is a fair allocation of emissions of greenhouse gases (over the long‐term and during the transition to the long‐term allocation)? In answering each question we must specify from whom any transfers should come and to whom any transfers should go. As the grounds for the answers we usually face a choice between fault‐based principles and no‐fault pri

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00093.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This article describes our effort to understand the Montreal Protocol as an unconventional approach to regulation, one that encourages the construction of volunteer partnerships, episodic networks, and regulatory communities comprised of public and private actors criss‐crossing institutional and national boundaries. We examine three provisions of the Protocol that give official governments and private global corporations latitude to create temporary arrangements that leap beyond their typical institutional constraints. The provisions that promote collaboration are the use of trade sanctions as an incentive to cooperate; the creation of the Interim Multilateral Ozone Fund (IMOF), the funding mechanism that links the fate of developed and developing nations; and, the establishment of an international clearinghouse to share technology for reducing ozone depleting substances. Singly and together these mechanisms of coercion, exchange, and normative pressure permit individual actor's interests to be pursued, bind them into ephemeral but replicable networks of action, and result in the creation of the very meaning of regulatory compliance and effectiveness. The discussion draws out the implications of a transcorporate definition of power and global problem solving as it relates to democratic reliance on the political sovereignty of individual actors and nation

ISSN:0265-8240    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00094.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY