摘要:

SUMMARYThree alternative definitions of equity are presented, which coincide under special conditions only. The author prefers the definition that equity means equality of welfare. This presupposes measurability of welfare (or utility). Two methods of measurement are discussed, called revealed or indirect and direct measurement. Concrete applications of both are shown, together with their shortcomings. In both cases equitable distribution is found to be less unequal than actual distribution in the Netherlands. Further research needed, on additional relevant determinants of utility and on learnability of some capabilities are formulated.

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02619.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYThe authors empirically and extensively analyse the budget incidence for the FRG (1969). They pursue four aims: Based on a realistic (theoretical) concept, also showing the limitations of the analysis they determine (1) the overall redistribu‐tional effects of the budget to be 20.2|X%, measured by the difference between the Gini‐coefficients under realistic assumptions, (2) the process of redistribution in the form of a sequence analysis, which proves that direct and indirect revenue compensate each other and that only government expenditure has an overall effect on redistribution, (3) extreme values (spans) of the budget incidence with the help of a sensitivity analysis of alternative hypotheses on the shifting of taxation, and these differonlyby |Mp 3‐4|X% compared with a middle variant, (4) modifications by the integration of the Aaron‐McGuire concept concerning pure public goods, which correspondingly widen the span depending on alternative marginal rates of substitution between public and private goods. The open and realistic concept enables the inclusion of other theoretical procedures and methods and the critical comparison of the results. Political conclusions are not drawn, but some of the limitations of redistribution are r

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02620.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYConvexity constraints create problems in the theory of public goods that need not arise in the theory of private goods. This paper discusses these problems, which have not been fully recognized in the standard literature. The dimensionality of public goods becomes critical. A distinction must be made betweenconsumption units, that enter as arguments in utility functions, andproduction units, which enter production functions, and which are directly purchased by the demanders. Standard convexity properties defined on consumption units need not imply convexity properties on production units, given standard properties of utility and production functions. The ambiguities are clarified by reference to the orthodox literature in public goods theory.

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02621.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYLet consumers decide whether the public sector shall be extended by progressive taxation or by fees. A majority for the fee case will be found (a) if tax financed public supply deviates from the allocative optimum to a too high extent; especially in case of public oversupply; (b) if the preferences for the public supply and thus the sensitivity to allocational questions increase. This may lead to a dilemma for Social democratic parties that influence their voters in favour of increasing preferences for public supply and may loose the majority in favour of further redistributive policy; (c) if the voters believe that there is already too much redistribution. In such a case the majority is more sensitive with respect to further redistributionandwith respect to deviations from the allocative optimum. (If on the other hand the present situation of the public sector is characterized by a too high deviation from the allocative optimum the majority is more sensitive with respect to further deviations from the allocative optimum only; not with respect to further redistribution! This is an interesting asymmetry between allocation and distribution as far as the extension of the public sector is concerned.)

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02622.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYThe effects of individual economic incentives are modified by social interactions among cooperating members of an organization such as the firm. An economic theory of such interaction, based on individual rationality or utility maximization, is briefly outlined, and various hypotheses on the effects of profit‐sharing, piece‐rates, and employee participation in decision‐making are derived. These hypotheses are tested on data collected from smaller West German firms with various participation and profit‐sharing schemes, independent of legal co‐determination requirements. The predicted positive effect of participation, and of profit‐sharing combined with participation on productivity is confirmed, in contrast to rece

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02623.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SUMMARYThis paper analyzes allocations of agricultural extension services in India in terms of a model of villages as political interest groups. The empirical evidence is viewed in the light of two competing models of the distribution and quantity of public goods: the ‘efficiency’ model of Hayamiand Ruttan(1971), and the ‘interest group model’ of the newly developed literature on economic regulation. It is argued that in villages that are relatively remote from competitive markets, large landholders may be able to induce landless farmers to support the provision of extension services, because of the dependence of the landless farmers on the landowners for jobs and credit. In the absence of this ‘dependency structure’, the freerider problem would tend to prevent the village from acting collectively. This hypothesis is supported with evidence that villages with relatively large proportions of landless farmers are more likely to receive extension services,ceteris paribus; this relationship holds only in villages that are relatively far from links to competitive markets. It is also found that more highly educated farmers receive more extension services, despite evidence from previous studies that education and extension are substitutes in agricultural production. These results and other evidence support the interest group model over the efficiency model, which holds that efficiency considerations are the main determinants of governme

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02624.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02625.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02626.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02627.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0023-5962    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1980.tb02628.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY