摘要:

A model of elections is put forth in which there are two parties, each representing a different constituency of voters (the poor and the rich). The political issue is the choice of a proportional tax rate on income, revenues from which are used to finance a public good. There is a stochastic element in which party wins the elections, due to party uncertainty concerning voter preferences, or due to uncertainty concerning which voters will show up at the polls. A political equilibrium in one period consists in a tax policy put forth by each party, and a probability that each party wins. A long series of elections is simulated (100 periods). Voter preferences for the public good changeadverselyas a function of length of time the incumbent party has been in power and the level of the public good in the last period. Thus, if the party in power funds high levels of the public good, preferences start to move against the public good. This model generates dramatic political cycles, and it is argued that these cycles are of fundamentally different origin from that discussed in the realignment literature.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00101.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper experimentally investigates individual level search within a spatial election model. In our model the voter is required to cast a ballot for one of two candidates. However, the voter's task is made non‐trivial since, even though the location of one candidate is known, the location of a second candidate is unknown. To reduce uncertainty regarding the unknown candidate's location, the voter may undertake an information search. We find that search in this environment is a function of the cost of search, the quality of information, and the voter's location on the issue spac

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00102.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Employing a commonly‐used method of creating a continuous income variable from categorical data, we obtain results from a fiscal survey that reveal a strong nonmonotonic effect of income on the willingness to pay additional taxes for state expenditures on education and public aid. The existence of income‐demand schedules that are U‐ or inverted U‐shaped casts doubt on the appropriateness of assuming that the median income voter is decisive. After investigating the sensitivity of our results to different income measures, we suggest that fiscal surveys should be designed to provide sufficiently detailed information about respondents’incomes, especially for high‐income

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00103.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Governments facing elections may strategically manipulate policy instruments in order to increase their re‐election chances. The incentives for strategic manipulation are studied in the context of a debt management model, in which two parties with different inflation aversion compete in elections. It is shown that the inflation‐averse party may issue nominal debt in order to make its opponent “look bad” to voters, thus getting closer to the median voter. Nominal debt artificially enlarges the ex‐post inflation tax base, causing higher inflation. Conversely, an inflation‐prone government may issue indexed debt in order to reduce inflation

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00104.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In rent seeking contests agents compete over a given amount of resource a prize. To increase the likelihood of winning the prize, the agents expend efforts. This paper addresses the issue of entry to and entry deterrence from rent seeking contest. The main purpose of the analysis is to provide an explanation for the empirical fact that the number of participants in contests is usually small. I also obtain results on the relationship between the intensity of competition in a contest and the amount of the contenders’expenditure

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00105.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY