摘要:

This paper investigates whether Lockean first claimer property rights should be expected to emerge in anarchy. Individuals behind a veil of uncertainty about their future wealth decide independently whether to commit to using fcrce. Neither the contractarian hypothesis that a thicker veil of uncertainty supports more co‐operation nor Demsetz's hypothesis that well‐defined property rights emerge as the value of the externality from not having private property increases is unambiguously implied by the mo

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00063.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper examines a mechanism that underlies both the political business cycle and the cycle in non‐economic policies executed by politicians. We show that if rational voters suffer from forgetfulness (a noise in the memory). then government expenditure on the production of public good increases as elections approach. Hence, the model describes a cycle that is observed in the government expenditures of democratic societies. Unlike previous models, this model does not require that the government have information superiority over rational voters with respect to its competency. According to this model, incumbents transfer resources from the beginning of their terms of service and use them near the end of their terms. We also find that the less concave the production function, the wider the cycl

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00064.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper explores the implications of generational selfishness in a model in which each generation has its own government. Such selfish generational governments will potentially distort the economy along a number of dimensions. One is the monopolization of factor supplies; another is the under‐ or overprovision of durable public goods. We demonstrate that selfish generations may place sizable marginal taxes on their factor supplies in order to monopolize their factor markets. We also show that selfish generations will provide inefficient levels of durable public goods both at the local and national levels. Finally, we demonstrate that generational inefficiencies can arise even in models of cooperative bargaining because of the first‐mover advantage of earlier generati

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00065.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00066.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Redistributive taxation imposes no excess burden when: (a) the taxed group behaves collusively and takes into account government behavior, and (b) the redistribution outcome is an interior solution (i.e., after redistribution the government values a marginal dollar of income to each class equally). There is no dynamic inconsistency in capital taxation under the same conditions.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00067.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Despite widespread concern and discussion, no consensus exists concerning the causes of the “infrastructure crisis” or its implications for the efficiency of government decision‐making more generally. We investigate several models of the determination of local public capital expenditures. Using Euler equation methods, we cannot reject the hypothesis that construction spending is determined by unconstrained, forward looking municipal planning. Consistent with this result, the stochastic structure of resource flows is an important feature of the determination of construction spending. Only unanticipated changes in a community's resources alter its demand for structures, with an unanticipated increase of one dollar increasing current construction spending by about 5.6

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00068.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY