摘要:

When individuals choose not only goods, but also how to process information, there is a bias: people tend to process information so that they feel good about themselves. This bias is particularly important in voting behavior, where agents have almost noindividualeffect on public choice outcomes, and therefore almost no incentive for unbiased use of information. Two examples are given. In one example, an adaptation of the classic overdepletion problem, the public chooses not to counteract externalities by appropriate tax policy. In the second example public policy follows the choices of experts, contrary to the interest of the public.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00002.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

A rent or transfer is politically contestable when policy decisions are subject to influence by potential beneficiaries and losers. This paper studies contestablility of rents and transfers when contenders place different valuations on the politically allocated prize. Asymmetric valuation inhibits participation by low‐valuation contenders. The model explains the phenomena of small numbers of active participants in contests to exercise political influence and low lobbying and other influence‐seeking outlays relative to the value of politically allocated pri

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00003.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain in 1846 has been much debated as to whether interest groups or ideology contributed most to this policy reform. This paper examines a conventional view that Sir Robert Peel, in proposing repeal, converted from protection to free trade under the influence of the ideas of political economy. It is shown that economic ideas had a crucial influence on Peel, but that he remained skeptical of political economy as a doctrine.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00004.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The theory of endogenous trade policy formation argues that tariffs emerge from the political process. This occurs because of conflicting economic interests trying to redistribute income in their favor through the adoption of suitable trade policies. Mayer and Riezman (1987) questioned this view arguing that if individuals differ only in factor ownership they would always prefer some tax/subsidy policy to tariffs. Here we allow individuals to differ not only with respect to factor ownership, but also with respect to consumption preferences and income tax treatment. We show that tariffs might be the social decision even though nobody's individual preferences suggest tariffs as the best choice.

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00005.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

I examine a simple model of rent seeking behavior in order to determine the correct way to measure welfare loss due to rent seeking. I conduct this analysis using a general equilibrium version of the standard partial equilibrium consumers' surplus cost‐benefit setup. I conclude that the ordinary tools of cost‐benefit analysis, such as consumers' and producers' surplus, are up to the task of measuring the deadweight loss due to rent seeking, as long as they are applied in the proper general equilibrium cont

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00006.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0954-1985    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00001.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY