ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00155.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe author argues that despite appears to the contrary the transcendentalism naturalism dichotomy is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is possible for someone to give a transcendental argument demonstrating that the world must have certain characteristics. If the argument is correct, i.e., if water is necessarily H2O, then science and the naturalist will find water to be H2O in fact. One can therefore be a transcendentalist and naturalist at the same time. The dichotomy is not exhaustive either, since it is possible to develop a philosophy which is descriptive of reality and yet is neither transcendental nor naturalistic. The author illustrates this alternative with a view he calls “Piecemeal Realism

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00156.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Common sense explanations of human action are often framed in terms of an agent's beliefs and desires. Recent widely received views also take believing and desiring (as well wishing, intending and even thinking) as attitudes of an agent to linguistic or quasi‐linguistic entities. It is here claimed that such a narrow view of cognitive attitudes is not supportable, since even among lingual non‐verbal responses are often overriding evidence for belief and desire, even where they run counter to sincere verbal assents. The view is also curiously non naturalistic in that it disallows ascribing beliefs and desires altogether to non‐lingual and pre‐lingual. In the present paper a “common sense” explanation of action in accordance with the triad Desire, Belief, Action, is seen as a useful phenomenological “theory” provided that language centrality is not tak

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00157.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Where there is mind there is representational opacity, and vice versa. Opacity arises because where there is representation there may be misrepresentation, and the status of the misrepresenting sign or state of the misrepresenting sign‐user can only be characterized via the terms used for a correctly represented object. Opacity is not a blight for naturalism, but must be recognized and exploited if naturalism is to adequately embrace the mental. Opacity is illustrated for language, for the mental itself, for depiction and other non‐linguistic representation. Alethic modality, a candidate counterexample to the thesis (opacity without mind is defused consequences for our conception of non‐human intelligence are out

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00158.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper explicates and defends a social‐naturalist conception of internationality and intentions, where internationality of scientific expressions is fundamental. Meanings of expressions are a function of their place in language‐systems and of the relations of systems to object‐level evidence and associated community activities‐including deliberation and experiment. Naturalizing internationality requires social‐intellectual reconstruction exemplified by the scientific community at its best. This approach emphasizes normative elements of pragmatic conceptions of meaning and their function in orientation. It requires social conditions and intellectual practices making knowledge of intentions possible. Scientific ends, methods, and meanings, together, constitute culturally evolved instruments of adaptation to, and reconstruction of, physical and cultural env

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00159.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryA satisfactory analysis of the well‐known Hangman Paradox is not known to us. Two theses:1. The logical solution of the Hangman Paradox(es) is easy and disappointing.2. The origins of the(se) paradox(es) are manifold and inexhaustible. We analyse particularly perspicuous tuneless version of the paradox due to Hollis (1986).In a sequel which is to appear in Dialectica we analyse two versions of the original Hangman Paradox.Vorbemerkung: Der zweite Autor verdankt Henri Lauener menschlich und philosophisch mehr als dieser Artikel zeigen wird. Es ist mir selten oder nie gelungen, Henri Lauener für eine meiner philosophischen Positionen zu pewinnen, aber ich glaube mich darin mit ihm einig, dass es sich lohnt, Formalismen ernst zu nehmen, um ihre Grenzen zu erkenn

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00160.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryIn the above titled remarks, a distinction between general terms and predicates is made following Quine and Leonard. It is argued that, given Quine's characterization of extensionality vis a vislanguages in his bookWord And Object, a language similar to the regimented language Quine regards as adequate for the purposes of science and philosophy, except for the addition of constant singular terms some of which may be irreferential, can be completely extensional. If correct, this conclusion, apparently at odds with a proof to the contrary by Lambert in 1974, is a heretofore unnoticed consequence of the distinction between predicates and general terms, and should be of concern to naturalistically inclined philosophers.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00161.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Based on an idea ofAjdukiewiu, a method of equifunctionalityis developed to provide a formal explication of the notion of sameness of use relative to some system of rules. Given this, a set‐theoretic explication of Lauener's context dependent conception ofsynonymyis introduced by looking at languages of ropositional logic, and compared both with Ajdukiewicz's original conception and with Carnap's explication of synonymy based on hismethod of extension and intentio

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00162.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryTruth‐definitions play a crucial role in the foundations of logic and semantics. Tarsik‐type truth‐definitions are not possible to formulate in a usual first‐order language for itself, and they have been criticized because they do not account for what makes them definitions of truth. It has been suggested that truth should instead be characterized by reference to the «language‐games» of verification and falsification. The author's game‐theoretical semantics (GTS) here explained for formal first‐order languages, can be thought of as a realization of this idea. More technically speaking, GTS can also be thought of as a systematization of the well‐known aepsilon‐delta, definitions in the foundations of analysis. In GTS, truth is not defined by reference to winning a play of a game, but as the existence of a winning strategy in the game for the verifier. In a first‐order language, the game‐theoretical truth‐condition of a sentence S can accordingly be expressed by an explicit second‐order (sigma‐one‐one) sentence asserting the existence of the Skolem function of S.The semantical games of GTS must be distinguished not only from the «games» of formal proof (which serve to establish logical rather than material truth) but also from the «games» in volved in our ordinary activities of verification and falsification. The latter have been modelled as games of inquiry by the author, and they are essentially epistemic games where the meaning of truth is taken for granted and where the aim of the game is to come to know certain truths. To assimilate them to the semantical games constitutive of (material

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00163.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractNaturalism holds that there is no higher access to truth than empirically testable hypotheses. Still it does not repudiate untestable hypotheses. They fill out interstices of theory and lead to further hypotheses that are testable.A hypothesis is tested by deducing, from it and a background of accepted theory, some observation categorical that does not follow from the background alone. This categorical, a generalized conditional compounded of two observation sentences, admits in turn of a primitive experimental test.The observation sentences themselves, like ape cries and bird calls, are in holophrastic association with ranges of neural intake. Denotation of determinate objects figures neither in this association nor in deducing the categorical from the scientific hypotheses. Hence the indeterminacy of reference; ontology is purely auxiliary to the structure of theory. Truth, however, is seen still as transcendent at least in this sense: we say of a superseded scientific theory not that it ceased to be true, but that it is found to have been false.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00164.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY