摘要:

SummaryThe paper examines the conditions someone's believing must satisfy in order to be reasonable and argues that an important necessary condition concerns the nature of the origin and sustain‐ment of the belief. This requirement cannot be captured by conditions on logical relations among the believed propositions, but instead concerns the psychological process of reasoning, concluding, or basing one belief on another. The implications of this result for traditional epistemology are examined, and it is concluded that the most important issues are not just those involved in determining the nature of confirmation but include psychological investigation of the process of belief acquisitio

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00763.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe paper undertakes to disentangle the problem facing Kant's Third Antinomy from the problems confronting the transcendental reality of time and the distinction between things–in–themselves and appearances. Three different resolutions of the Third Antinomy are distinguished. It is shown that neither the appeal to the transcendental ideality of time nor to the distinction between things‐in‐themselves and appearances in the firstKritikresolution succeeds in resolving the antinomy as Kant states it. The appeal in theGroundworkto the distinction between heteronomy and autonomy shifts the problem. And the reliance in the secondKritikon our ability to knowa priorithat there are necessary connections in our experience fails in yet another way to forestall the antinomy. The common core of all of these difficulties lies in what is called here the Duplication Problem: The tendency of the distinctions introduced to resolve the problem to duplicate the very antinomy they are supposed to resolve. Finally, it is shown how isolating these issues helps to strengthen Kant's argument for transcendental ideality and to clarify the conditions under which the antinomy can he r

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00764.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

RésuméCette étude retrace l'évolution des recherches de von Wright en logique déontique depuis 1951 jusqu'à la fin des années 70. J'ai préféré, à une suite d'exposés isolés et indépendants à propos de chaque système, m'attacher à la mise en évidence des différences et des similitudes; je montre en quoi chaque étape est originale. Je reléve d'abord les traits saillants du système de 1951 et ceux de la construction de 1963, après avoir analysé les raisons du passage du premier à la seconde. Ensuite, j'expose le profil essentiel de la généralisation métalogique de 1968. Enfin, je décris les tentatives de réduction de la logique déontique à des logiques plus familieres et j'examine à propos de positions très recentes ce qui va dans le sens de la reprise de l'ancien et ce qui marque des ruptures radicales avec tout ce qui précéde.SummaryThis study describes the evolution of von Wright's investigations about deontic logic from 1951 until the late 70. Rather than isolated expositions of a series of independent systems, I prefered to attach myself to differences and similitudes. I strived to show the originality of each conception. First, I call attention to the 1951 system principal features; I analyse the reasons which compelled von Wright to construct the 1963 logico‐philosophical system. Then I describe the essential profile of the 1968 metalogic generalisation. So, I come to the reductionnist tentations, concluding with the examination of very recent positions. In the conceptions of the late 70, we find a lot of things which repeat the past, but al

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00765.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00766.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY