摘要:

AbstractThe paper argues for the applicability of the notion of collective truth as opposed to distributive truth, that is, truth at times or possibilia taken in groups rather than individually. The underlying reasoning is that there are transtemporal and transworld relationships, e.g., those involving the relations ofbeing a descendant ofandthinking about.Relationshipsareone type of) truth‐makers. Hence, there are transtemporal and transworld truth‐makers. There fore, there is transtemporal and transworld truth, i.e., collective truth. A semantics is developed (formalized in the appendix) which embodies the notion of collective truth, and which thereby, it is argued, has various advantages over standard intensional semantics. For example, it avoids a commitment to certain impossible entit

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00116.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ZusammenfassungDieser Aufsatz befasst sich mit Freges Argumentation gegen die Definierbarkeit der Wahrheit. Ich unterscheide in Freges Argumentation zwei Einwände. Der erste Einwand zielt darauf ab zu zeigen, dass eine Wahrheitsdefinition zirkulär ist; nach dem zweiten Einwand verwickelt uns eine Wahrheitsdefinition in einen unendlichen Regress. Die meisten Autoren, die sich mit Freges Argumentation auseinandergesetzt haben, haben sich hauptsachlich mit diesem zweiten Einwand beschäftigt und ihn als unzutreffend abgelehnt. Nachdem ich Freges Argumentation und die übliche Erwiderung darauf dargestellt und systematisiert habe, untersuche ich die Eigentümlichkeit des Wortes «wahr», auf der dime Argumentation beruht. Ich komme zu dem Schluss, dass, wenn man Freges Auffassung zur Behauptung und zur Erkenntnis akzeptiert, die Wahrheit als undefinierbar betrachtet werden muss, wed dann jede Wahrheitsdefinition zirkul

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00117.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

summaryThis paper argues that an epistemological duality between mind/brain and an external world is an uncritically held working assumption in recent computational models of cognition. In fact, epistemological dualism (ED) largely drives computational models of mentality and representation: An assumption regarding an external world of perceptual objects and distal stimuli requires the sort of mind/brain capable of representing and inferring true accounts of such objects. Hence we have two distinct ontologies, one denoting external world objects, the other cognitive events and neural transformations. A basic question is then raised and explored: If the elements of these two different ontologies are so radically different, how can the one access the other?The last part of the paper sketches an alternative toEDand the associated two ontologies account. Instead of external world objects being construed as independent givens, initiating perceptual processes, they are rather interpreted as ‘computational constructs’. It is argued at length that this account is far more consistent with recent computational models of mind/brain than the two ontologies model associated withED. It is further claimed that an ontology of cognitive and neural states, as well as an external world ontology, have no other epistemic status that as contingent working hypotheses. As such, both ontologies are in principle amenable to revision as evidence, explanatory models, and scientific practices mutually readjust and redefine one another over t

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00118.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

RésuméPour marquer le vingtième anniversaire de la mort du philosophe Ferdinand Gonseth, le fondateur et l'animateur de Dialectica, cet article lui est consacré. Les autres – le premier biologiste et le second thélogien, membres du Comité directeur – abordent brièvement quelquesuns des thèmes les plus marquants de la philosophie gonséthienne. Il est ici question, pour l'essentiel, de l'Idonéisme et de certaines de ses implications, de l'option d'ouverture relative à la recherche scientifique: la procédure des quatre phases de la démarche expérimentale, les quatre principes caractérisant la connai

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00119.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book reviewed in this article:No Need to Speak the Same Language?*Pragmatism: An Open Question.*Méthodologie des sciences et théologie*An Introduction to Logi

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00120.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00121.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY