摘要:

SummaryThe aim of this paper is to exhibit some important features of the two versions of the Deduction. In the first edition, Kant emphasizes the role of imagination as an autonomous faculty; in the second, on the contrary, imagination, though keeping its synthetic function, is subordinated to the understanding. This reversal in the role of imagination is bound up to a paradoxical conception ot the object which pervades the two editions of theCritique.The Deduction should be conceived as a way out of the paradox, each edition favoring one alternative against the other. The role of the subject is correlative of the way the object is conceived: this article shows how German Idealism radicalised Kant's position in the first edition, and Positivism the second version, though both were led to depard from Kant's general requirement that knowledge was a result of the equilibrium of concepts and intuitions.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01494.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

RésuméEpicure, Descartes, Kant appartiennent à une même lignée philosophique, l' intuitionnisme. Par leur méthode; ils ne séparent pas la vérité des precédés par iesquels on parvient à elle et, de façon plus ou moins directe, ils restreignent la validité du tiers‐exclu et des preuves par l' absurde. Par leur anthropologic: en revendiquant passionément la liberté. Par leur théodicée: en conciliant de façon originale mécanisme et finalité, celle‐ci étant posée en vertu' une sorte d' acte de foi rationnelle mais conservant son

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01495.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ZusammenfassungHume unterscheidet zwischen dem Prinzip, dass alles, was geschieht, einen Kausalgrund hat, und dem Prinzip der Regelmässigkeit der Natur, d.h. dass ähnliche Kausalgriinde ähnliche Kausalfolgen haben. In der zweiten Analogie der Erfahrung versucht Kant, die Erklärung unserer Annalime des ersten Prinzips, welche er irrtümlieherweise Hume zuschreibt, zu widerlcgen. Er versucht dort nichl ausdrücklich das zweite Prinzip zu begründen, aber J. Dodge hat nachgewiesen, dass die zweite Analogie doch versteckterweise eine Begründung dieses Prinzips enthält, Kant selbst begründet jedoch dieses zweite Prinzip nur als ein regulatives Prinzip der reflektierenden Urt

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01496.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe paper is concerned with the connection between Kant's conception of transcendental schematism and his analysis of the conditions of the possibility of synthetica priorijudgments. After dealing with some of the standard objections to Kant's theory, I argue that transcendental schemata must be construed as pure intuitions. I then point out that thePrinciples of Pure Understandingare a set of synthetica priorijudgments which assert the function of the various schemata as necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, and that each of these judgments involves the relation of a pure concept to pure intuition (as is required by Kant's theory of synthetica priori).Finally, I argue that the connection between a category and its schema must itself be both synthetic anda priori.It therefore requires a “deduction”, which Kant himself does not provide, but which I endeavor, in part, to provide for

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01497.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe paper discusses major issues concerning the A104‐10 transcendental‐object theory. For that theory, ourde reknowledge becomes related to its object just because our understanding (using the concept of a transcendental object)thinksa certain object to stand related to the intuition via which we know. Employing an apparatus of intensional logic, I argue that this thought of an object is to be understood as a certain sort of intuition‐related,de dictothought. Then I explore how, via such ade dictothought, we can nevertheless achievede reknowledge. This question involves an important Kantian reduction ofde retode dictoouter‐object thinking, which I consider. Finally, I investigate some further topics about the transcendental object. I endeavor to show, throughout, that Kant's theory of that object is crucially related to matters of intensi

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01498.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe ontological argument fails because of an operator order switch between (1) “necessarily there is an (existentially) perfect being” and (2) “there is a being which necessarily is (existential‐ly) perfect”. Here (1) is trivially true logically but (2) problematic. Since Kant's criticisms were directed at the notion of existence, not at the step from (1) to (2), they are misplaced. They are also wrong, because existence can be a predicate. Moreover, Kant did not anticipate Frege's claim that “is” (“ist”) is ambiguous between existence, predication, identity, and class‐inclusion. To restore the ontological argument, an extra premise is needed to the effect (roughly) that it is known who the existentially perfect being is. The question is raised whether Kant could have meant the failure of this extra premise by his thesis that existence is

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01499.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe key terms in Kant's argument for the synthetic apriority of mathematics are analyzed. The result is a somewhat “idealized” interpretation of these terms, which, however, is appropriate in respect of Kant's main argument. Taking this interpretation as a framework, a model for giving evidence for numerical statements is presented, which is in good agreement with Kant's argument, and according to which numerical statements are indeed synthetic and also, in a sense,a priori.Thus they formally render counter‐instances to Hume's thesis that no general synthetic statements can bea priori.Nevertheless they do not play the part given to them in Kant's metaphysics, since they turn out not to be “genuinely” general, so that no Copernican revolution is required to explain their epistem

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01500.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryOn Kant's view, the moral individual cannot be “programmed” by sociological or educational techniques. To brainwash is to destroy freedom while to educate is to develop the capacity for freedom. Plato's proposal to invent mythic roots as incentives to moral conduct is not acceptable, since it involves not merely the propagation of falsehoods, but its success requires also a totalitarian state that destroys freedom. Not being concerned with mere legality, but with encouraging truemorality, he has renounced forcing moral goodness.Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao all proposed educational programs that put down the mythic roots of their secular religions. They project and indoctrinate into people's mind a new vision of society and man. The diabolical religion of National Socialism was inculcated by terror and totalitarianism.Kant's ethics has it mythic roots, too, which lie in Christian pietism. But his fully developed theory proscribes the use of any mythic religion not based on moral

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01501.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ZusammenfassungObwohl in neuerer Zeit das transzendentale Denken auch in der Ethik angewendet wird, fehlt selbst in der Kant‐Forschung eine genauere Untersuchung der Frage, wie sich das transzendentale Programm zu Kants eigener Intention einer praktischen Vernunftkritik verhält. Die folgenden Überlegungen zeigenerstens,dass das transzendentale Philosophieren nicht bloss in der Erkenntnis‐ und Gegenstandstheorie, sondern auch in der Theorie der Sittlichkeit sinnvoll ist. Sie erörternzweitens,welche Elemente derKritik der praktischen Vernunfttatsächlich auf die transzendentalen Fragestellung zurückgehen. Da wesentliche Teile der Kantischen Ethik das transzendentale Programm grundsätzlich sprengen, wirddrittensKants Idee einer vernunftkritischen Ethik entwickelt, umschliesslichjene Teile, die nicht durch den transzendentalen Ansatz erklärt werden können, vom Programm einer praktischen Vernunftkritik her zu verstehen. Die Abhandlung leistet zugleich einen Beitrag zur systematischen Ethik‐Diskussion. Denn sie zeigt, dass eine sachgerechte philosophische Ethik sich weder auf das analytische oder hermeneutische noch auf das transzendentale Programm festlegen lässt, vielmehr nur durch das Ineinandergreifen mehrerer Verfahre

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01502.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ZusammenfassungKants Anspruch, gestiitzt auf die «Iogisehe Bedeutung» von «Kausalität», die Annahme einer «Kausalität aus Freiheit» mit den Ergebnissen der Erfahrungstheorie in Einklang bringen zu können, wird in Frage gestellt. Darüber hinaus wird bezweifelt, dass jene Annahme dem Zusam‐menhang eines transzendentalphilosophischen Gedankengangs angehört, da sie weder im selben Sinne wie in der Erfahrungstheorie als Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Sittengesetzes noch als ob‐jektiv gültiges Prinzip aufgefasst werden kann. Sie sprengt daher den Rahmen der transzendentalphilosophischen B

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1981.tb01503.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1981

数据来源: WILEY