摘要:

SummaryIn developing his claim that meaning cannot be understood independently of truth, Donald Davidson argues that a theory of meaning will take the form of a Tarskian theory of truth. In this essay I seek to describe more fully the structure of a Davidsonian theory of meaning and the extent to which Davidson modifies Tarski's account. 1 consider and reject John Foster's claim that Davidson takes, or should take, truth as a formal primitive, and argue that it is Davidson's principle of charity which plays the essential role in giving theories of truth empirical application.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1988.tb00900.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryIn Davidson's Theory of radical interpretation the principle of charity plays a crucial role. However the principle is the subject of widespread misunderstanding. The author attempts to provide an overall account of the principle and in doing so details some aspects of the holism which characterises the Davidsonian approach to interpretation. Charity is shown as inseparable from that holism. Two aspects of the principle are distinguished and some objections to the principle are also considered.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1988.tb00901.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1988.tb00902.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1988.tb00903.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1988.tb00904.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1988.tb00905.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY