摘要:

SummaryAttributions of intrinsic Intentionality must be distinguished from other kinds. Intrinsic Intentionality is a natural biological phenomenon, caused by processes in the brain and realized in the structure of the brain. This view makes it possible to see how both naive mentalism and naive physicalism can be true. Intentional causation is crucial to the production and explanation of actions. This form of causation has special logical features not common to other kinds of causation. Teleology is an intrinsic feature of certain biological organisms.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01237.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01238.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01239.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01240.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryStarting from examples of genuine perception and naive hallucination, different theories concerning the relation between the intentional and the real object are being discussed. It is shown that Meinong's theory is the most natural one, but it is argued against Meinong that the notion of “converse intentional property” should play a greater r

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01241.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe paper defends a theory of mind according to which certain sorts of acts arereal material relationsand compares this theory to causal theories of reference and perception. All mental acts are dependent for their existence upon the subject (person, organism) whose acts they are. Relational acts are dependent also on intended objects in the world. The relational theory thus implies a rejection of the Cartesian thesis to the effect that we could in principle have exactly the same thoughts even though the objects of these thoughts did not exist. It implies thereby also a rejection of Husserlian phenomenology. Husserľs earlier work on the formal ontology of part, whole and dependence nevertheless provides a framework which can allow a precise formulation of the relational theory

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01242.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryIn this article the thesis is defended that all objects of intentional attitudes are of one sort, while the thesis is rejected that epistemic attitudes can be assimilated.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01243.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ZusammenfassungDen Schwerpunkt des Aufsatzes bildet der Ubergang von der statischen Strukturanalyse des Bewusstseins zur genetischen Konstitutionsanalyse, der für die vertiefte Auffassung Husserls von Intentionalität bedeutsam ist. Dieser Wandel folgt aus der Einsicht, dass sich die Konstitution von Gegenständlichkeit nicht in einzelnen distinkten Akten vollzieht, sondern in zeitlicher Genesis, in welche sowohl aktive vergangene Konstitutionsleistungen als auch passive Vorkonstitutio‐nen eingehen. Um diese Sedimentierungen aufzudecken, hat Husserl die phänomenologische Analyse der intentionalen Akte fortentwickelt zur Intentionalanalyse. Diese Art der Analyse führte auch zu einer neuen Thematisierung des Ich. Dieses blieb nicht länger blosser‘QuetlpoP der Akte, sondern trat als ein Feld von Selbsterfahrung in Sicht, so dass durch seine sinnkonsti‐tuierenden Leistungen es selber besondere Eigenarten gewinnt und so sich selbst als konkretes E

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01244.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe theory of so‐called‘mental images’, which is put forward again in contemporary cognitive psychology, is criticized by way of elaborating the distinctly different intentional structures of the mental activities of‘remembering something’and‘representing something pictorially’(by means of a painting, photo, sculpture, etc.) It is suggested that psychology in its concept and theory formation could use profitably phenomenological‐descriptive analyses of the different forms of intentionality as exemplifi

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01245.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe philosophical core of a psychological theory of cognitive (thought) processes (Aebli 1980/81) is developped and commented, focussing on the problem of intentionality, this term being taken in the normal and in the phenomenological (Brentano/Husserl) sense. Actions, perceived processes, their states and results, operations (sensu Piaget) and concepts are seen as related insofar as they all establish relations between elements, are generated by construction and can be objectivated. These acts and/or the objectives that control them, are intentional insofar as their structure is activated. Such activation is characteristic of living systems. Intentionality sensu Brentano/Husserl is limited to acts of presentation, a contemplative conception which lacks the constructivity and the dynamism of our pragmatistic concept of action and thought.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01246.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY