ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00749.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00750.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ZusammenfassungDie Arbeit diskutiert die These C. G. Hempels, dass allgemeine Gesetze in den Naturwissenschaften und in der Historie die selbe ‘theoretische Funktion’ innehaben. Zu diesem Zweck unterscheidet der Autor zwischen systembildenden und genetische Strukturen bildenden Wissenschaften, denen als Darstellungsformen die Theorienhierarchie und die Narration entsprechen. Diese beiden Grundformen der Organisation unseres Wissens über Tatsachen werden auf einen Unterschied in der Erklärungsweise zurückgeführt, der nicht logischer, sondern pragmatischer Natur ist. Es ist dies der Unterschied zwischen Subsumption und Zurechnung. Während bei der systematischen Organisation des Wissens das zugrundeliegende Theoriengefüge die Bedingungen exakt festlegt, unter denen ein Faktum als erklärt anzusehen ist, fehlt eine solche erkenntnis‐leitende Funktion der Gesetze bei der genetischen Organisation.SummaryThis paper discusses C. G. Hempeľs contention according to which universal laws fulfil the same ‘theoretical function’ in Natural and Historical Science. To this end, the author differentiates between system‐building and genetically structured sciences. Their modes of presentation are respectively hierarchically ordered theory and narrative. These two basic ways of arranging our knowledge of facts are led back to a difference in explanation, of a pragmatic, not logical nature, that is, to the difference between Subsumption and Ascription. Whereas in the systematic organization of knowledge, the basic underlying theory sets the exact conditions, under which a fact can be described as explained, such an epistemological directive function of laws is not to be found in g

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00751.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryIt is shown that the concept of understanding cannot be reduced to a combination of knowing that, knowing how, and knowledge by acquaintence. First, it is shown that understanding and knowledge have different objects. Then “understanding what” is analyzed along Aristotelian lines. In the central part of the paper it is shown that understanding objects defined by constitutive rules involves a non‐propositional component. This notion of “understanding” is shown to cut across the humanist‐scientis

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00752.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThis paper states the belief that both an “irrationalist” conception of the humanities which is hostile to any theory construction, as well as a “positivist” one which tries to reduce all knowledge to the scientific model of deduction and induction must be avoided. This leads to Chisholm's notion of epistemic consequence. The Chisholmian reconstruction of epistemology is then viewed as an explication of the phenomenologi‐cal program, and it is discussed in how far this program can meet the objection of those who argue against introspection and for social practice and historical r

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00753.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe doctrine ofVerstehenis here interpreted as a solution to the problem of other minds. The problem of other minds, which has its analogous for external perception and memory, may be put by asking: By means of what epistemic principles may we exhibit the justification we have for attributing particular thoughts and feelings to persons other than ourselves? It is suggested that such principles will refer to the phenomena ofVerstehen.ResumeLa doctrine de la compréhension (Verstehen) est interprétée ici comme une solution au problème des autres psychismes, qui a son analogue pour les perceptions externes et pour la memoire et qui peut etre mis sous la forme ?une question:Quels sont les principes epistemologiques qui nous permettent de justifier notre attribution de pensées et de sentiments particuliers à des personnes autres que nous‐mêmes?≪. Ľauteur suggère que ces principes se rapporteront au phénomene de la

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00754.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThis paper contends, that theories and models describing and explaining empirical data, are not privative to Natural Science. Similarly, models of interpretation are produced in the Human Sciences, and wherever we want to expound and understand. A few examples are offered to show that such model present, besides words, concepts, sentences and complex sentences, a further category of semantic elements. Interpretative models turn out to be relational systems, which can be divided into three classes, according to the logical‐grammatical character of the elements to be found in the

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00755.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

RésuméOn discute ľapplicabilityé de la convention T de Tarski à une théorie de la signification. A cet effet, deux aspects de la communication sont distingués. ?une part il sembie essentiel de déployer la communication à partir ?un réseau de croyances communes. ?autre part (et sans doute ?abord) ľessence de la communication est de rendre maximal ľaccord épistémique entre les interlocuteurs. La solution proposé consiste à rappeler qu'avant ?être commune, la croyance a été communiquée dans un contexte privilégié, appelé ici dialogue référentiel. On tire alors les conséquences, ?abord sur la fonction de référence, ensuite sur ľélargissement qu'il faut apporter aux conditions de base ?une théorie de la signification, si ľon veut tenir compte de ce procés de maximisation lui‐même.SummaryIn order to discuss the applicability of Tarski's convention T to a theory of meaning, we have to draw a distinction between two aspects of communication. On the one hand, we have to consider the grounding of communication in a network of common beliefs. On the other hand, and indeed primarily, maximizing the epistemic agreement between locutors is essential to communication. The solution proposed consists in showing that, before becoming common, a belief has to be communicated in a priviledged context, i. e. in a so‐called “referential dialogue”. Consequences are drawn first upon the role of reference, secondly upon the necessary extension of the basic conditions for a theory of meaning, in order to give an

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00756.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

RésuméĽauteur propose ?illustrer et ?expliquer le concept de comprehension en reprenant le probleme de I'asymetrie des sujets et des predicats tel que P. F. Strawson ľa posé et partiellement résolu. II s'agit decomprendre, en un sens fort, le phénomene de ľasymétrie. Un rapprochement entre philosophie logique (informelle) et sémantique linguistique permet de généraliser la solution strawsonienne: ?une part, on peut traiter simultanément le cas de la predication monadique et celui des relations dyadiques; ?autre part et surtout, la cause profonde de ľasymetrie ainsi généralisée semble se trouver dans une autre asymétrie que ľauteur identifie sous le nom ? asymétrie quantitative ≪. Ce résultat confirme que, tant en philosophie logique qu'en linguistique, une methode informelle est féconde, et en même temps aussi rigoureuse que la méthode formelle.SummaryBy way of illustrating and clarifying the concept of understanding in the theoretical sense in which to understand something is tantamount to being able to explain it, the author takes up the problem of the asymmetry of subjects and predicates with regard to negation in philosophical logic. How muchexplanationcan we hope achieve in such a field? If we bring to bear on the problem of the asymmetry (as well as on the underlying problem of the general structure of atomic propositions) recent results in linguistic semantics, we get a generalization of P. F. Strawson's proposed solution: an abstract structure is shown to be common to monadic predication and dyadic relations, and the cause of the asymmetry which is characteristic of that structure is identified as a new, probably “quantitative” asymmetry between subjects and predicates. These results contribute to substantiate the case for aninformalmethod, both in philosophical log

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00757.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThis paper is onwhatwe understand when we are said to understand semiotic sequences, such as sentences, arguments, proofs, road indications, jokes, and works of art, and onhowwe can understand them. The theory of understanding defended here is psycho‐pragmatic, and it is anthropologically oriented. The contention is that we always understandsignificances:users of semiotic systems (producing and understanding signs) have anacceptancerelation with a significance ≪[(phi;(p)]: the conveyed proposition is modified by the universal rationality operator ≪, and by the partial mood‐operator(Section 1 and 2). We can understand significances by the fact that they aredescriptively presentedto the users of semiotic systems ascommon valuesof the community to which they belong and want to belong (Sections 3

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1979.tb00758.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1979

数据来源: WILEY