摘要:

AbstractProduct quality of injection‐moulded' plastics greatly depends upon the injection flow rate of molten polymer during filling. In this paper, an optimal control of the filling process is shown to improve the properties of the moulded parts. Our goal is to provide an efficient basis for designing a supervisory computer‐controlled injection moulding system. A dynamic model of the filling process is developed. It takes into account the effect of molten polymer on the dynamics of the injection ram. Based upon this model, an optimal control input, which is a control current actuating the injection ram‐screw assembly, is derived from the minimization of a quadratic performance index which serves to keep the front velocity of molten polymer flow into the cavity at a desired value. The optimal input thus obtained has been implemented via a microcomputer for on‐line control of the injection process. The experimental results show that surface blemish and residual stress of the moulded parts can be reduced via this optimal

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040102

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIsaacs' formulation of the game of two cars, which assumes players of circular shape, is extended to include the effect of elongated players and elliptical shapes in particular. The geometry is used to model the problem of ship‐collision avoidance as a differential game which suggests the name of ‘game of two ships’. The game of two ships is formulated as a free‐time unbounded game of kind. A general solution for the optimal controls on the terminal manifold is given and is also used to derive a model analytical solution for the primary optimal path emanating from the target set. The occurrence of singular arcs as well as the condition for switching are also discussed. Finally, a capture criterion for the pursuit‐evasion game between a faster elliptical pursuer and a more manoeuvrable circular evader is also derived. This capture criterion is given in the form of a relationship between the geometrical dimensions of the players, their speed and acceleration ratios, and the maximum range that the manoeuvrable, yet slower, evader can indefinitely guarantee without being captured. If both players have circular shapes, our solution reduces to an already‐known capture criterion for the ‘game

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040103

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn this paper the relations between the finite horizon optimal control problem with receding horizon and the infinite horizon problem are discussed; the system is assumed to be linear, time‐invariant, and stabilizable. The cost function is quadratic but the output in the integral of the cost function may be undetectable. Control problems with terminal cost and problems with linear terminal state constraints are dealt with. The solution of the infinite horizon problem as well as the limiting behaviour of the solution of the finite horizon problem are derived. A necessary and sufficient condition for equivalence is developed; it is satisfied for the standard linear regulator proble

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040104

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractAn essential feature common to control schemes for plants with time delays is the use of a plant model for purposes of prediction. Any difference between plant and model is referred to as mismatch. The paper is concerned with how mismatch affects the stability and performance of an optimal control scheme for linear systems with delay in control.

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040105

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper analyses strategic lobbying behaviour under the assumption of disorganized opposition. A dynamic programming approach is used. The optimal rate of lobbying expenditure is shown to be an increasing function of time. A specific example is computed to determine the influence of various parameters. Next, the case of lobbying against an active counterlobby is considered in a dynamic game‐theoretic framework. The Nash equilibrium rates of lobbying expenditure are computed for a specific example with symmetric players. The equilibrium rates of expenditure for the two lobbyists may be either everywhere increasing, everywhere decreasing, or single peaked as a function of time. In addition, some comparative statics results are reversed relative to those of the disorganized opposition mode

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040106

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040107

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040108

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040109

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040110

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-2087    

DOI:10.1002/oca.4660040111

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY