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1. |
WHEN DID YOU FIRST BEGIN TO FEEL IT? — LOCATING THE BEGINNING OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS |
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Bioethics,
Volume 10,
Issue 1,
1996,
Page 1-26
J. A. BURGESS,
S. A. TAWIA,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTIn this paper we attempt to sharpen and to provide an answer to the question of when human beings first become conscious. Since it is relatively uncontentious that a capacity for raw sensation precedes and underpins all more sophisticated mental capacities, our question is tantamount to asking when human beings first have experiences with sensational content. Two interconnected features of our argument are crucial. First, we argue that experiences with sensational content are supervenient on facts about electrical activity in the cerebral cortex which can be ascertained through EEG readings. Second, we isolate from other notions of a‘functioning brain’that which is required to underpin the view that a cortex is functioning in a way which could give rise to rudimentary conscious experiences. We investigate the development in the human fetus of the anatomical and chemical pathways which underpin (immature) cortical activity and the growth and maturation of the electrical circuitry specifically associated with sensational content in adult experience. We conclude (tentatively) that a fetus becomes conscious at about 30 to 35 weeks after conception; an answer based on a careful analysis of EEG readings at various stages of cortical development. Finally, we survey the possible ethical ramifications of our ans
ISSN:0269-9702
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00100.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1996
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
THE ARGUMENT FROM TRANSFER |
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Bioethics,
Volume 10,
Issue 1,
1996,
Page 27-42
CHRISTIAN MUNTHE,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTUtilitarian arguments on bioethical issues regarding human reproduction typically start with the view that it is wrong, other things being equal, not to procreate when this would have resulted in an additional being with a life worth living. The paper takes this view for granted and examines the common utilitarian claim that overpopulation and destitution in the world mean that, in practice, this obligation to procreate, other things being equal, often turn into a (categorical) obligation not to procreate. A version of this argument is defended— a version called the argument from transfer — according to which, rather than having additional children and care for them in order to make them happy, many people in the West ought to abstain from procreation and take care of destitute children already existing. The reasoning leading up to this conclusion raises some philosophical questions, seldom discussed in connection with bioethics, which indicate that the argument from transfer, although supporting the claim above, cannot neutralise the obligation to create mare happy people as easib as assumed by utilitarians. It is argued that the argument from transfer may place many people facing the choice of procreation in a peculiar moral dile
ISSN:0269-9702
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00101.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1996
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
FUTILITY AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF PHYSICIANS |
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Bioethics,
Volume 10,
Issue 1,
1996,
Page 43-55
BRADLEY E. WILSON,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTIt is becoming increasingly common (at least in the United States) for doctors to appeal to futility judgments as the basis for certain types of clinical decisions, such as the decision to withhold CPR. The clinical use of futility judgments raises two basic questions regarding futility. First, how is the concept of futility to be understood? Secondly, once we have a clearer understanding of futility, what role should determinations of futility play in clinical decision‐making? Much of the discussion about the concept of futility has centered on the value‐ladenness of futility judgments. I argue that futility determinations need to be distinguished from two other types of value‐based judgments, namely, identification of the goals of treatment and treatment decisions based on an assessment of the benefits and burdens of treatment. If this distinction is sound, it suggests a very limited role for futility determinations in clinical decisionmaking, a role which should serve to promote communication between doctor and pa
ISSN:0269-9702
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00102.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1996
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
ASSISTING SUICIDE IN MICHIGAN |
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Bioethics,
Volume 10,
Issue 1,
1996,
Page 56-70
JOSEPH ELLIN,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTPerhaps no American state has seen more legal activity on assisting suicide than Michigan, but despite legislation, a study Commission, several legal cases and a state Supreme Court ruling, the state seems much further from a humane resolution of the question than when the activities of Dr. Jack Kevorkian began in June of 1990. This note summarizes major legal events over a twelve‐month period (ending May, 95), which included jury acquittal of Dr. Kevorkian, the inconclusive report of the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, the failure of the state legislature to enact legislation to replace the expired absolute but temporary prohibition, and the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Mich v. Kevorkian declaring assisting suicide a common law felony and ruling that in certain circumstances a person assisting suicide can be prosecuted for murder. The Commission's model decriminalization proposal and the bills subsequently introduced in the legislature (all of which to varying degrees surrounded assisting suicide with restrictions and safeguards), as well as the decision of the Supreme Court, are discussed. Certain puzzling features of the latter, especially with regard to the kind of causation that can turn helping another commit suicide into murder, are note
ISSN:0269-9702
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00103.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1996
数据来源: WILEY
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5. |
BOOK REVIEWS |
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Bioethics,
Volume 10,
Issue 1,
1996,
Page 71-86
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摘要:
Book Reviews in this Article:Accountability of Bioethics Committees and Consultantsby Sigrid Fry Revere.Research Ethics in Practice: The Animal Ethics Committees in Sweden,The Beginning of Human Lifeedited by Fritz K. Beller and Robert F. Weir. DordechtDementia und Aging: Ethics, Values, ad Policy Choices, edited by Robert H. Binstock, Stephen G. Post and Peter J. White‐house.Least Worst Death—Essays in Bioethics on the End of Lifeby Margaret Pabst Battin.All God's Mistakes—Genetic Counseling in a Pediatric Hospitalby Charles L. Bosk.Informed Consent: Patient Autonomy and Physician Beneficence within Clinical Medicineby Stephen
ISSN:0269-9702
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00104.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1996
数据来源: WILEY
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6. |
BOOKNOTES |
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Bioethics,
Volume 10,
Issue 1,
1996,
Page 87-91
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ISSN:0269-9702
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00105.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1996
数据来源: WILEY
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7. |
BOOKS RECEIVED |
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Bioethics,
Volume 10,
Issue 1,
1996,
Page 91-91
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ISSN:0269-9702
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00106.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1996
数据来源: WILEY
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8. |
THE CONTRIBUTORS |
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Bioethics,
Volume 10,
Issue 1,
1996,
Page 92-92
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ISSN:0269-9702
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00107.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1996
数据来源: WILEY
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9. |
FROM THE EDITORS |
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Bioethics,
Volume 10,
Issue 1,
1996,
Page -
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PDF (108KB)
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ISSN:0269-9702
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00099.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1996
数据来源: WILEY
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