摘要:

ABSTRACTWhat kind of threat does terrorism pose to a community? Two models of terrorism are introduced. The Unjust War model views terrorism as an attack on the innocent, but thereby misidentifies its criminal character. The Political Crime model regards it as violence for political ends, by‐passing democratic channels. This misconstrues the terrorist's aim of waging war against a state whose legitimacy he contests. Associated with the models of terrorism are two conceptions of community, the Communitarian and the Hobbesian, respectively. While the Communitarian conception sees the community as independent of the state, the Hobbesian identifies them, thus assimilating an attack on the state to a threat to the community. The Hobbesian conception, however, even when amplified by democratic theory, provides inadequate resources to rebut a challenge to the state's legitimacy, in particular one concerning territorial boundaries. Arguments for permitting secession are discussed. The Communitarian conception may be able to ground legitimacy claims; but it may also justify some terrorist campaigns as needed to preserve communitie

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00248.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTConflicts between the good of each and the good of all are often presented in terms of freedom versus equality, with liberals pulled one way by libertarians and the other by social democrats. When we distinguish between negative and positive notions not only of freedom but also of equality, the liberal freedom ‘to pursue our own good in our own way’is a positive freedom involving a negative idea of equality (or ‘equity’). Yet ‘equity’is not strong enough to deal with the problem of public goods. Trust is a public good, essential if markets are to work and dependable only where there is a moral commitment to a positive basic equality amo

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00249.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTSummed up in the coinage of the term ‘pre‐embryo’is the denial that human beings, as such, begin to exist from the moment of conception. This denial, which may be thought to have significant moral implications, rests on two kinds of reason. The first is that the pre‐embryo lacks the characteristics of a human being. The second is that the pre‐embryo lacks what it takes to be an individual human being. The first reason, I argue, embodies an untenable view of what it is to be human. The second reason exploits certain logical difficulties which arise over the possibility of twinning. I question the relevance of the appeal to such difficulties and conclude that there is no good reason for denying that a human being begins to exist from the moment of c

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00250.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe essay enquires whether action that authentically expresses the self who acts constitutes freedom. Features of authentic action that tempt toward this assimilation are identified, and a recent theory of freedom that propounds the assimilation is examined. An illustrative example of authentic action in conditions of unfreedom is discussed. Reasons are proposed for judging the equation of freedom with authenticity a mistake. Noted in particular is the error of confusing the subjective condition of authentic choice with the objective circumstance of unconstrained interpersonal relations.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00251.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThis essay considers a common objection to commercial surrogacy on the grounds that the child is treated as a commodity for sale by the surrogate and the commissioning couple. I analyse one prevalent argument for the view that commercial surrogacy is a kind of baby‐selling, not service‐selling. I conclude that this argument rests on an implausible interpretation of what the reproductive services are. I defend an alternative interpretation of typical surrogacy agreements. Furthermore, I argue that this interpretation fails to support the conclusion that the surrogate is primarily or exclusively selling a baby, rather than her reproductive services. My primary concern is to diagnose a conceptual error in an argument against surrogacy. However, the interpretation of surrogacy arrangements that is defended helps to shift the focus from the issue of whether or not the child is degraded to the issue of whether or not the surrogate degrades herself or is degraded by the commissioning cou

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00252.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTTo what extent is honesty or truthfulness morally obligatory in trade and advertising practices? It is argued here what while we have a general right, in business as elsewhere, not to be lied to, we have no general right, either in our business or other pursuits, not to be deliberately deceived. Certain restrictions on deceptive practices in trade and advertising, even unintentionally deceptive practices, are, even so, morally defensible: viz. where the practice would mislead reasonable people to a material degree or where it would mislead especially vulnerable people who are predictably unreasonable. It is suggested that a code of practice for trade and advertising which exaggerates the degree of truthfulness which is morally obligatory may actually be corrupting in effect.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00253.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThis paper argues that generosity as a moral virtue is only consistently and fully possible to practise in the kind of polity that upholds natural individual human rights, including the basic negative right to private property. The paper sketches a characterisation of generosity and explains the sense in which it can be a moral virtue. Some of the assumptions underlying the concept of moral virtue are considered and it is argued that contrary to some recent claims, it is possible to conceptualise as well as to practise moral virtues in our age. Yet it is also shown that certain political prerequisites are necessary for practising generosity. Furthermore, it is shown that there cannot be any generosity involved in a polity in which one is forced to share one's wealth with those who might be the beneficiaries of generous conduct. Finally, it is argued that even in a polity with a very limited government some acts of official generosity are possible.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00254.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTJournalists often take themselves as having a moral duty to protect their sources. If the sources in question leak information from government departments, government ministers will consider themselves as having the moral right to demand that the journalists disclose the identity of those sources. This creates conflicts of value between what journalists and ministers consider to be right. It is argued not only that traditional moral theories cannot resolve such moral conflicts, but that they are in a sense a good thing. A world in which the conflicts occur may be considered to be better than one in which they are prevented from occurring, for one can expect to have both effective journalism and effective government only in the former. The most important consequence of this view is that it makes the professional ethics of journalism (and, by implication, those of other professions) into something more than the mere application of universal moral rules to the various situations in which those who work in the profession are liable to find themselves.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00255.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00256.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThis paper considers Robert Nozick's account of self‐esteem, as presented inAnarchy, State, and Utopia.I criticise three aspects of it. First, the claim that people gain self‐esteem only when they believe that they possess greater quantities than others of some valued talent or attribute. Secondly, the view that there will always be a conflict of interests between people over the acquisition of self‐esteem. Thirdly, the proposal that the most promising way to improve levels of self‐esteem across a society is to educate people so that they value a number of different activities and attributes. I argue against Nozick that there are non‐comparative standards of doing something well or successfully that provide a person with a means of self‐assessment; there is no necessary conflict of interests over the acquisition of self‐esteem; reforming basic social and economic institutions is a promising way for a society to increase levels o

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00257.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY