摘要:

ABSTRACTThe principle of nationality is widely believed to be philosophically disreputable and politically reactionary. As defined here, it embraces three propositions: national identities are properly part of personal identities; they ground circumscribed obligations to fellow‐nationals; and they justify claims to political self‐determination. To have a national identity is to think of oneself as belonging to a community constituted by mutual belief, extended in history, active in character, connected to a particular territory, and marked off from others by its members’distinct traits. Such identities are inevitably partly mythical in nature, yet they answer a pressing modern need, the maintenance of solidarity in large, anonymous societies. They are allied to no particular political programme. They do not require the suppression of minority cultures within the political community. They do not justify a secessionist free‐for‐all. Nor finally does recognition of the role of sentiments in constituting national communities commit us to a subjectivist view of social obligations. Philosophers should recognise the value of these loyalties even if they cannot be rationally grounded in a strong

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00058.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTRecent writings in feminist ethics have urged that the activity of caring is more central to women's lives than are considerations of justice and equality. This paper argues that an ethics of care, so understood, is difficult to extend beyond the local and familiar, and is therefore of limited use in addressing the political problems of the modern world. However, the ethics of care does contain an important insight: if references to care are understood not as claims about women's nature, but as reflections on the extent to which moral obligations are both unchosen and conflicting, then an ethics of care can supplement an ethics of justice, and can also provide a more realistic account of both men's and women's moral life.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00059.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTI argue that people have a right to self‐determination when they are plainly predominant in a certain territory and do not violate the civil liberties of minorities. But there is no self‐determination without the preservation of self‐identity and the cultural preservation that goes with its secure existence. So to preserve autonomy and self‐determination people must preserve their cultural identity and this cannot be securely sustained in modern conditions without a nation‐state concerned to nourish that identity. Such considerations support a right to secession when certain conditions are met. The conditions are that the people in question have a cultural identity, live in a distinct territory which they have inhabited for a long time, form an extensive majority, and respect the civil liberties of the minorities living in that territory (as well as elsewhere). Where they are such a group they have a right to secede from a larger state to which they are historically attached. These conditions, I argue, are met

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00060.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTAlthough sexual continence is no longer considered a necessary condition of the philosophical life, various spiritual traditions favour the development of a form of ‘concentration’(samadhi)of the person which they claim to depend on such continence, and of which a perceived outcome is a natural state of ‘chastity’. Such ‘concentration’is insisted upon on the grounds that it is the condition under which the real nature of things is disclosed to the practitioner. Since philosophers are concerned to discover the real nature of things the implication might be thought to be that sexual continence should come back into favour and philosophers become spiritual practitioners. However, a distinction is made between ejaculatory and non‐ejaculatory sexual activity and the suggestion made that despite the dominant tradition in the West, the relevant forms of concentration may develop under a regime of non‐ejaculation rather than of continence understood as abstinence. This is the context of a discussion of the state of male sexuality and its dedication to the practice of ejaculation, which is seen as a constraint upon the energy available for action and upon the formation of the energy on which the disclosure of reality is said to depend. Male judgments about the plausibility of such claims are themselves contingent upon the state of male sexuality and its dedication to the practice

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00061.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIs free will a necessity or a luxury for an understanding of applied ethics? This paper offers an argument for why it is the former. First some reasons are offered why applied ethics, under the influence of Rawls's metaethics, has eschewed the topic of free will. It is shown why this is a mistake — namely, how applied ethics will falter without such a theory. The paper then argues for a conception of free will and indicates what ethical and public policy implications may flow from this theor

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00062.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIn an article in Encounter, Antony Flew usefully opens up the issue of what racism is by giving three ‘concepts’: (1) ‘unjustified discrimination’; (2) ‘heretical belief; and (3) ‘institutionalised racism’. He rejects senses (2) and (3) in favour of (1) and finds much ‘anti‐racism’in fact guilty of it. This article, while benefiting from Flew's account, argues that it basically misconceives and underestimates racism by ignoring its complex ideological (sense 2) and institutional (sense 3) character. In regard to (2) it is argued that we need to distinguish scalar and statistical claims from the binary ‘us/them’essentialism characteristic of racism. In regard to (3) it is argued both that affirmative action is required by justice and that it entails ‘collateral injustice’as well as

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00063.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTAccording to many contemporary observers, including Hillel Steiner [1], Herbert Hart [2], John Gray [3] and Isaiah Berlin [4], the equal liberty principle lies at the heart of liberalism. Yet despite its central place in liberal theory, it has attracted little critical appraisal. This paper seeks to examine the meaning and some of the policy implications of the equal liberty principle, paying particular attention to the elucidations produced by Herbert Spencer, Steiner and Hart — the only systematic analysts of the notion of equal liberty. In part 1, the meaning of the equal liberty principle is discussed, and it is shown to be intrinsically ambivalent. In part 2, where certain policy implications are considered, the conclusion is reached that the equal liberty principle is ambiguous in its policy prescriptions, and requires to be supplemented by some other principle before it can be unequivocally applie

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00064.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTAccording to Avner de‐Shalit, our relationship with future generations is one of obligation based on welfare rights, not on basic human rights. This is because welfare rights derive from a shared community, and because we and future generations are members of the one ‘transgenerational’community. I argue that although it is correct to ground our relations to possible future people in the concept of community, it is wrong to think that rights‐talk of any kind is an adequate articulation of that sense of community. To present the issue of our relationship with future generations in terms of a choice between human rights and welfare rights misrepresents the nature of reasoning on these sorts of concerns. In a properly developed communitarian position there is a model of philosophical reasoning that can better articulate and interpret our intuitions about community in general and about our relations to potential future people in particular. Furthermore, such articulations can give those intuitions persuasiv

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00065.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00066.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book review in this ArticleLocal Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens JON ELSTER, 1992 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press International Justice and the Third World ROBIN ATTFIELD&BARRY WILKINS (Eds.)The Dependent Elderly Luke Gormally (ed.)University of Liverpool Populist Democracy: a Defence Torbjorn Tannsjo, 1992 LondonKarl Marx, Our Contemporary: Social Theory for a Post‐Leninist World Keith GrahamThe Symbolic Function: Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy of Language Gemma Corradi FiumaraPoincare and the Philosophy of Mathematics Janet Folina, 1992 London, Macmillan Press with the Scots Philosophical Club 202 p

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00067.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY