摘要:

ABSTRACTFacing heretofore unknown waves of new immigrants, the Israeli Government and the mayor of Jerusalem issued a comprehensive development programme, including rapid and massive construction. Cities with historical and aesthetic uniqueness, particularly Jerusalem, are likely to lose their special features and beauty. A question is raised: how can an argument in favour of conservation of the special beauties of such cities be advanced in light of the urgent need to supply shelter and jobs for their inhabitants?The paper has two aims: to analyse the reasons for environmental ethics'failure to discuss urban preservation so far, and to put forward a rationale for urban preservation. The latter derives from the political wisdom of King Solomon and from the notion of anthropocentric intrinsic value.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00086.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTWhat have natural aesthetics and environmentalism in common? Not much if the former deals with nature as if it were an artwork or a gallery of art objects, or if the latter grounds the protection of nature in consequentialist terms. Suppose, however, one adopts a non‐consequentialist environmentalism which, further, stakes out a primary view of nature as terrain rather than as habitat; i.e., a view which is not biocentric (life‐centred), let alone anthropocentric. This environmentalism is rooted in the belief that we areprima faciebound not to interfere in any of the world undefined by culture whether or not it supports life. There is a reason forbidding us from strip‐mining the far side of the moon, say, even though no habitat is thereby destroyed, nor is there any blight creating visual offence to those immediately affected. To furnish the reason for such an ‘acentric’environmentalism, one needs a natural aesthetic. Why? By elimination, because the stock appeals grounding any moral stance—to rights or interests or happiness or autonomy—are unavailable. The ‘subject’of an acentric environmentalism is insensate. But an ‘acentric’aesthetic seems even more curious than its environmentalist dependent. It would entail an aesthetic viewpoint indifferent to human scale and perspective, the very factors which underwrite any cultural aesthetic. So, is such an aesthetic possible? The barest glimpse of how it might look

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00087.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTBrandon Carter's anthropic principle reminds us that observers are most likely to find themselves in the spatiotemporal regions containing most of them. One should tend to prefer theories which make one's own observed spatiotemporal position fairly ordinary. This could much increase the estimated likelihood that our technological civilisation was not the very first in a universe which would include hugely many such civilisations. Similarly, which is the Carter‐Leslie ‘doomsday argument’, it could much increase the estimated likelihood that you and I are not in the earliest 0.01%, for instance, of all humans who will ever have lived—as we would be if the human race survived for long even at its present size, let alone if it colonised the galaxy. With the aid of thought‐experiments, the article defends this argument against many objections. Other thought‐experiments suggest, though, that the argument is weaker if the world is radically indeterministic. In this case, it perhaps indicates only that we should not be highly confident in humankind's long survival, because high confidence would be equivalent to saying that any indeterminism would be unlikely to

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00088.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that the economistic conception of development which has all along been touted by development ‘experts’and which has been made the monolithic framework for understanding and tackling the problem of development, is lopsided and terribly inadequate. That conception, it seems to me, fails to come to grips with the complex nature of human society and culture. That complexity, I argue, calls for a comprehensive, not segmented, approach to the development of human society. I therefore argue also that development must be perceived in terms of adequate responses to the entire existential conditions in which human beings function, conditions which encompass the economic, political, social, moral, cultural, intellectual and others. It is pointed out that these conditions are greatly helped by a congenial political climate and a viable ethical and cultural framew

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00089.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTTheories of the influence of technology on modern Western society have failed to take into account the important role played by a widespread pattern of sociotechnical practice. The pattern in question involves the interplay of technology, rights, and numbers. This paper argues that in the context of an ever more potent technological arsenal and an ever increasing number of individuals who have access to its elements and believe themselves entitled to use them in maximalist ways, adherence to the traditional notion of individual human rights is anachronistic and increasingly problematic for the quality of life in contemporary society. To combat this situation, I criticise the idea of human rights as timelessly valid and offer a contextualised account of these constructs, one able to take on board the implications of their maximalist exercise in a populous technological society. I conclude by illustrating the struggles being waged over the adaptation of human rights to techno‐demographic reality in two areas of contemporary Western society: urban planning and medicin

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00090.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTAre there specific moral rights connected with employment? Three putative rights are considered: The right to work, the right of the most competent to be chosen, and the right to equal pay for work of equal value. It is very commonly assumed that we enjoy one or another of these rights. This paper argues that none of these rights exists. After all, what would it be to infringe someone's right to work? And is not employment sometimes in someone's gift? Again, if two people are doing work of equal value, and the contract terms are both generous and individually acceptable to the parties, why need these terms be the same?

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00091.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe contemporary world is politically organised on the assumption that there exists an international community which should be governed by the rule of law under the authority of the United Nations Organisation. This idea may be called cosmopolitan liberalism. It is commonly criticised for ineffectiveness caused by excessive respect for the sovereignty of states. Recently, it has become apparent that cosmopolitan liberalism is inadequate to conceptualise and consequently to solve the practical problems posed by nationalism. David Miller has sought to rehabilitate ‘nationality’in left‐liberal political philosophy. Reasons are presented for believing that his defence of nationality is inadequately articulated with cosmopolitan liberalism and consequently morally dangerous from a liberal point of

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00092.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTA recent article has claimed that one of the significant benefits which people in the UK derive from the existence of the National Health Service must be lost if the Service adopts the QALY maximisation principle to allocate medical resources. The argument fails, partly because its author conflates two distinct benefits. The first is almost certainly important, but there is no reason to believe that it would be lost if the principle were introduced (while there is some reason to believe that the benefit would actually be greater). The second, once it is isolated from others with which it may be confused, is much less obviously important; and in any case there is again no reason to believe that it would be lost. Moreover, to argue against the principle on the ground that the second benefit would disappear is really to beg the question against the principle. We could not justify our rejection of the principle on the ground that the principle's adoption would mean that we lost the second benefit.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00093.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe paper has to do with Peter Singer's statement ‘A German Attack on Applied Ethics’, and particularly with the claim that those who protested against his speaking at conferences in Europe in 1989 failed to recognise his right to freedom of expression.I argue that the right to free expression does not mean that we may say anything at all, to anyone at all, anywhere at all. Visitors to foreign countries, for example, have some obligation to be sensitive to local concerns.I also argue that there is an important difference between free expression, which is a basic right, and regular access to public platforms, which is a special right or privilege. This special right or privilege goes with certain jobs and professions, and could not be made universal. The German and Austrian protests against Singer temporarily deprived him of the privilege of access to a platform but were not attacks on the basic right of free speech as such. In fact the protests themselves could be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the right of free express

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00094.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTKen Hanly's recent article in thisJournal (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1992) takes issue with Ronald Coase's approach to resolving problems of externalities, as set forth in his classic paper ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. I argue that Hanly's discussion of Coase misinterprets or inappropriately rejects certain aspects of Coase's analysis, specifically, with regard to the reciprocal nature of externalities and the economic role of government. The resolution of externality problems is presented as an issue of selective normative choice as to whose interests are to count; neither efficiency nor morality claims are uniquely dispositive of the is

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1994.tb00095.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY