ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00182.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThis paper is about the problem of the moral responsibility resting on any person to form rational beliefs about, and moral attitudes towards, the deterrent threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which still lies behind the graduated nuclear response strategies now more fashionably discussed by military experts. The problem is to decide what kinds of reasons there are, and how to arrive in the light of them at determinate conclusions about deterrence and unilateral disarmament. Consequential arguments would be powerful, if only they were determinate; but not only do they not point conclusively to one strategy rather than another, there is not even sufficient reason for accepting one rather than another of the competing optimising criteria by which the strategies might be assessed. So the reasons of other kinds against forming a conditional intention to retaliate with a massive second strike could be conclusive, if retaliation itself could do no (consequential) good, and if, as is claimed, the conditional intention could not be simulated. To form such an intention is held to be contrary to core values of a humane, rationalist culture. To assent to a nuclear retaliatory strike would do violence to the moral nature of anyone participating in such a culture, and to form an intention to make (or condone) such a strike would be a corruption of such a nature. So too would condoning the fostering of such an intention in others, as a way of making the retaliatory intention credible. The author accordingly considers this argument against MAD, and for unilateral nuclear disarmament, sufficient, given the inadequacy of the consequential arguments, while acknowledging that this might involve great sacrifice. The paper concludes, however, by considering whether anyone can reject nuclear deterrence who also believes that resistance to Nazism in 1939 was justified, given the then prevailing belief that the war might be massively destructive. The author holds that there is no inconsistency in both supporting resistance to evil, even at risk of total destruction, and in refusing to form or condone a conditional intention to do equivalent but pointless evil in order to make a threat credible.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00183.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIf a doctor kills a severely handicapped infant, he commits an act of murder; if he deliberately allows such an infant to die, he is said to engage in the proper practice of medicine. This is the view that emerged at the recent trial of Dr Leonard Arthur over the death of the infant John Pearson. However, the distinction between murder on the one hand and what are regarded as permissible lettings die on the other rests on the Moral Difference Myth, according to which deliberate lettings die in the practice of medicine are not instances of the intentional causation of death.I argue that a doctor who refrains from preventing a handicapped infant's death, causes that infant's death and does so intentionally. He commits an act of murder. But, I suggest, not all instances of the intentional causation of death are morally wrong. To the extent that they are not, killing rather than letting die will often be the preferable option because more economical of suffering. Hence what is required is the abolition of the Moral Difference Myth and legislation to the effect that those doctors who justifiably cause a patient's death—whether by an action or by an omission—commit no offe

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00184.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTFollowing Rawls' seminal work, political philosophers and economists have recently shown great interest in different conceptions of equity or justice. Apart from Rawls' own principles, these have included utilitarianism, need and desert, horizontal and vertical equity and envy‐free distributions. None of these conceptions, however, seem to command general consensus; and this paper is an attempt to find out why. The conclusion is reached that they all fail because they do not take account of an essential element of equity: its relationship to the existence or otherwise of choice. An alternative conception is offered, based explicitly on that relationship; it is argued that this conception comes closer to capturing the essence of what is generally meant by the term equity than any of the others considere

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00185.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe purpose of this article is to supply a justification in moral philosophy for considering the grossly depraved criminal to be less than a normally responsible agent. Decisions concerning the responsibility of a person depend upon our ability to act and react morally with that person. The argument is that when we reflect on the implications of (1) the moral role that desires play in excusing or condemning actions and (2) the minimum moral requirements of punishment, we realise that a moral community does not exist between us and the grossly depraved. That is, we cannot apply key moral categoriessimpliciter, including the notion of guilt.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00186.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIt is sometimes suggested that academics should subscribe to a special professional ethics. The question then arises under what circumstances a professional ethics is called for. The answer suggested is that this is when the members of a profession have peculiar moral privileges. In the academic's case, these relate to special forms of freedom which academics usually possess, in distinction from other workers. These generate special temptations which a professional ethics would particularly warn against.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00187.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTI present and assess arguments both for and against censorship of pornography, explaining why the case on each side is inconclusive. In an effort to move beyond issues of censorship and to address the growing problem of violence in pornography, I propose a distinction between erotica and violent pornography. I then utilise this distinction to evaluate the moral status of, and certain social responses to, violent pornography. I show why most arguments that violent pornography is morally wrong rest on assumptions that either may not be true or do not apply to all instances of violent pornography. I also indicate why the only unconditional moral argument against violent pornography—an argument I find reasonable—will not be universally acceptable. Finally, I discuss two alternatives to censoring violent pornography. I argue that the first, which adapts Joel Feinberg's right of reasonable avoidability, is too weak, while the second, which advocates refusing all subsidy and support for violent pornography, is ultimately too strong as a social response in a society committed to free

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00188.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIn his book,A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues against the inclusion of non‐human animals within the scope of the principles of justice developed therein. However, the reasons Rawls, and certain commentators, have advanced in support of this view do not adequately support it. Against Rawls' view that ‘we are not required to give strict justice’ to creatures lacking the capacity for a sense of justice, it is initially argued that (i)de factoinclusion should be accorded non‐human animals since their exclusion strains just institutions, and (ii) Rawls' account of the sense of justice has implicit and undefended human chauvinist elements. Two further counter‐arguments are then developed in more detail. First, the suggestion that some non‐human animals do have a capacity for a sense of justice is explored. Second, the suggestion that the capacity for a sense of justice is unrealised in so many human beings that Rawls' basis for marking out a special place for them is undermined is explored. Attention is next given to Rawls' characterisation of the participants in the original position. It is claimed that there are no good reasons for disallowing the possibility that these individuals turn out to be non‐human animals in the real world. If sound, this claim brings non‐human animals directly within the scope of Rawlsian principles of justice. The claim is defended against t

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00189.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTWhen does ‘reduction’ in the harmless sense of relating one science to another involve a sinister devaluing of the valuable? Only when the ‘reductive’ explanation is (1) treated as excluding others, and (2) so chosen as to make a moral point by illicit means.(1) is never legitimate; different kinds of explanation all have their place and do not compete. It is made to look plausible by (2), which can occur in many situations, but is usually called reduction only when it involves the physical sciences. Two different dangers follow—reduction to the unknown entities of physics is chilling, but fortunately seems to have no particular moral consequences.Biological reductions often sound less remote; e.g. when sociobiologists talk of people as ‘survival machines’ for genes. The trouble here is not ‘biological determinism’ but fatalism, with apparent moral consequences, namely, the endorsement of universal competition. This idea is bad biology, compounded by illicit rhetoric. Biology itself cannot be a threat. The biological causes of human behaviour, including those found by sociobiologists in their calmer moments, are perfectly proper material for th

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00190.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe article considers various arguments put forward, on the subject of ‘sexual justice’, by Janet Radcliffe Richards in her book,The Sceptical Feminist: a Philosophical Enquiry.These arguments rest upon a version of ‘the difference principle’, and owe much to the exposition of this principle by John Rawls. It is argued that Radcliffe Richards fails to support her argument for sexual justice by reference to the difference principle. Indeed, it is argued that reliance by Radcliffe Richards upon this principle vitiates her advocacy of sexual justice. The article concludes by putting forward an obvious alternative to the difference principle; and with a suggestion as to why Radcliffe Richards fails to acknowledge the strength of this alte

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00191.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY