ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00001.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00002.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:This paper addresses the question of whether mental representations are compositional. Several researchers have claimed recently that there are empirical data that show mental representations to be context‐sensitive in a way that threatens compositionality. Some have then gone on to claim that connectionist encoding schemes are well suited to accommodate such noncom‐positionality. I argue here that the data do not show that mental representations are noncompositional, and that there are significant problems with the suggested interpretations of connectionist encoding sche

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00003.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Simulation Theory says we need not rely exclusively on prepositional knowledge of other minds in order to explain the actions of others. Seeking to know what you will do, I imagine myself in your situation, and see what decision I come up with. I argue that this conception of simulation naturally generalizes: various bits of our mental machine can be run‘off‐line’, fulfilling functions other than those they were made for. In particular, I suggest that visual imagery results when the visual system is run off‐line. I briefly review the empirical evidence and consider the philosophical implications, particularly concerning the mode of mental representation in

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00004.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Many psychologists think that concepts should be understood on analogy with the terms of scientific theories, yet the significance of this claim has always been obscure. In this paper, I clarify the psychological content of the theory analogy, focusing on influential pieces by Susan Carey. Once plainly put, the analogy amounts to the view that a mental representation has its semantical properties by virtue of its role in a restricted knowledge structure. One of the commendable things about Carey's work is that, unlike many other psychologists who appeal to the theory analogy, she takes seriously the need to specify how these structures are constrained. At the same time, the constraints she offers are insufficient. Her account also faces challenges from recent work in the semantics of natural kind terms.

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00005.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Understanding novel phrases (e.g.upside‐down daisy) and classifying objects in categories named by phrases ought to have common properties, but you'd never know it from current theories. The best candidate for both jobs is the Theory Theory, but it faces difficulties when theories are impoverished. A potential solution is a dual approach that couples theories (representations‐about categories) with fixed mentalese expressions (representations‐of categories). Both representations combine information in parallel when understanding phrases. Although there are objections to the notion that theories can combine, some of them lose their force when applied to a suitable dual

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00006.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:This paper considers Davidson's (1963) arguments for construing reasons as causes and attempts to show that he has failed to provide positive reasons for introducing causation into his analysis of rationalizing explanation. I consider various ways of spelling out his intuition that something is missing from explanation if we consider only the justificatory relation between reasons and action, and I argue that to the extent that there is anything missing, it should not be provided by construing reasons as causes. What is ostensibly missing, and what I think Davidson is after, is some kind of determinate relation between explanans and explanandum. I argue that this is too strong a requirement to place on rationalizing explanation.

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00007.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:I argue that a certain initially appealing Fregean conception of our shared semantic competence in our shared language cannot be made good. In particular, I show that we must reject two fundamental Fregean principles‐what I call Frege's Adequacy Condition and what I call Frege's Cognitive Constraint on Reference Determination. Frege's adequacy condition says that in an adequate semantic theory, sentence meanings must have the same fineness of grain as attitude contents. The Cognitive Constraint on Reference Determination says that in an adequate semantic theory mechanisms of reference determination will fix routes of epistemic access to referents and will mediate one‐sided recognition judgments about referents. I argue against Frege's adequacy condition that if meanings are sliced as finely as it requires there will be too many meanings to go around. I argue against the cognitive constraint on reference determination that even in an adequate theory of reference, mechanisms of reference determination must be sharply distinguished from routes of epistemic access. If so, we have little reason to expect an adequate theory of reference determination to directly illuminate Frege's cognitive puzzles or be sufficient to explain the basis of our one‐sided recognition judg

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00008.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00009.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00010.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY