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1. |
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: SURVEYING THE ‘OLD’ AND THE ‘NEW’ |
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Metroeconomica,
Volume 44,
Issue 1,
1993,
Page 1-28
Geoffrey M. Hodgson,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTThis paper surveys and compares the literature on the ‘new’ institutionalism (North, Williamson, etc.) with that of the ‘old’(Veblen, Commons, Mitchell). A criterion for distinguishing these two schools is suggested, along with criticisms of the limitations of each. The ‘new’ institutionalism is associated with methodological individualism and the idea that the individual should be taken as given. Particular attention is paid to ‘new’ institutionalist treatments of markets and firms. The paper moves on to examine some ‘old’ institutionalist criticisms of ‘economic man’ as well as some negative features of the ‘old’ institutionalism. On the positive side, the latter is seen to have an ‘evolutionary’ dimension, related to modern work in t
ISSN:0026-1386
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-999X.1993.tb00786.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1993
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
NEGATIVE SURPLUS VALUE AND INFERIOR PROCESSES* |
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Metroeconomica,
Volume 44,
Issue 1,
1993,
Page 29-42
Eiji Hosoda,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTOne of the most interesting results in value theory is that positive profits are consistent with negative surplus value. This result is obtained, using a two‐commodity linear model with joint production. Since existence of an inferior process is always implied in a two‐commodity model, the result has been supposed to be applicable to a limited type of technology. The purpose of this paper is to show that positive profits with negative surplus value do not necessarily imply the existence of such a process in higher dimensions. Although a different type of inferiority is implied, such a definition of inferiority is quite different from what is normally underst
ISSN:0026-1386
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-999X.1993.tb00787.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1993
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
COMPLEX DYNAMICS IN A KEYNESIAN GROWTH MODEL |
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Metroeconomica,
Volume 44,
Issue 1,
1993,
Page 43-64
Marc Jarsulic,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTThis paper develops a non‐linear differential‐delay model of the Keynesian system. The non‐linearities derive from a non‐linear relationship between capacity utilization and profitability, interacting with the effect of profitability on rates of investment. Local stability properties are established analytically, and numerical techniques indicate the possibility of chaotic behavior for some configurations of parameters. The results suggest that profitability and growth can interact to produce some of the apparently stochastic components of growth
ISSN:0026-1386
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-999X.1993.tb00788.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1993
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
INTER‐CLASS TRANSFERS IN A GOODWIN‐TYPE GROWTH MODEL |
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Metroeconomica,
Volume 44,
Issue 1,
1993,
Page 65-77
Lynn Mainwaring,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTIn a discrete‐time version of Goodwin's growth‐cycle model, the effects of capitalist philanthropy on workers are analysed in comparative static and dynamic terms. In either case, aggregate incomes of both classes may suffer. Likewise, concessions obtained through trade‐union activity, and resistance to labour‐saving innovations have harmful long‐term effects on the work
ISSN:0026-1386
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-999X.1993.tb00789.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1993
数据来源: WILEY
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5. |
INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES: A BARGAINING APPROACH |
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Metroeconomica,
Volume 44,
Issue 1,
1993,
Page 79-92
Claudio Mezzetti,
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PDF (685KB)
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摘要:
ABSTRACTThis paper analyzes a three stage game between a firm and its unionized workers. In the first period the firm decides the level of its capital stock. In the second period union and firm bargain over how many workers to hire and the wage rate, then production takes place. In the third stage new production occurs after union and firm have bargained over possible changes in the employment level and wage rate. The hiring of workers is associated with sunk training costs. The main result is that distortions in the use of labor due to sunk training costs induce distortions in the use of capital, even in the absence of sunk investment costs. Because of the strategic impact of investment on later stages of the game, the firm will not equate marginal revenue product and rental cost of capital. Underinvestment or overinvestment will result depending on whether the marginal revenue product of labor is an increasing or decreasing function of capital.
ISSN:0026-1386
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-999X.1993.tb00790.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1993
数据来源: WILEY
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