摘要:

AbstractThis paper examines the impact of accuracy feedback, effort feedback, and emphasis on either a goal of maximizing accuracy relative to effort or minimizing effort relative to accuracy on decision processes. Feedback on the accuracy of decisions leads to more normative‐like processing of information and improved performance only in the most difficult problems, i.e., decisions with low dispersion in attribute weights. Explicit effort feedback has almost no impact on processing or performance. The impact of the goal manipulation on decision processes was found to be consistent with the shift in strategies predicted by an effort/accuracy model of strategy selection. In particular, a goal of emphasizing accuracy led to more normative‐like processing, while emphasis on effort led to less extensive, more selective, and more attribute‐based processing and poorer performance. These results provide perhaps the clearest evidence to date of the effect of goals on processing differences. Complex interactive relationships between types of feedback and goal structures suggest the need for additional study of feedback and goals on adaptive decision beh

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960030102

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn three studies, it is shown that most subjects when asked to guess the outcome of an uncertain event (a die toss, the sex of a child, the winner of a match) will prefer to do so before the event. This holds regardless of consequences of the guess, or of variations in waiting time from the guess being made to the outcome being known. In a chance situation, a guess‐first preference may be partly explained by a ‘magical control’ hypothesis, but the preference persists in situations where such influences are less thinkable (sex of a child, die thrown by another person). When asked how prediction and postdiction guesses differ, most subjects agree that predictions are most exciting, and that postdiction failures cause more discomfort than prediction failures. Such differences are interpreted as due to the relative amount of perceived internal and external uncertainty in the task at hand. It is speculated that internal uncertainty is felt most acceptable when matched by a corresponding external uncertainty, and most aversive when contrasted to an externally established

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960030103

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper examines the presumptions behind, and methods within, two approaches toward the analysis of decision problems – Conflict Analysis and Strategic Choice. These offer complementary perspectives, based respectively on particular notions of conflict and uncertainty. It is suggested that these perspectives can usefully be combined in order to provide more effective ways of helping with complex decision problems, and some preliminary forms of decision model are propose

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960030104

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractResearchers have obtained conflicting results regarding which of the four cells of a two‐by‐two information matrix affect covariation judgments. Here published covariation studies are used as data in a lens model study. Regression models were estimated for actual correlation and subjects' judged correlation, with the four cells used as independent variables in the models. It was concluded that all four cells affected covariation judgments in this meta‐analysis and that the complex Pearson's phi was well approximated by a linear model. Additionally, aggregated judgments of covariation matched phi better than they matched the linear model of phi. Additional analyses were conducted to test whether cell usage results differed when data sets with negative correlation were deleted (they did not), whether experimenter emphasis on cells affected subjects' use of cell data (it appears likely), and to test whether the match with Pearson's phi was an artifact of using aggregated data (it appears li

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960030105

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractUnder certain conditions people give a conjunction of events a higher probability than one of its constituents. This finding has been called the ‘conjunction fallacy’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). One such condition is when the conjunction includes a possible cause and an outcome (called ‘causal conjunctions’) because the strength of the causal link biases the probability judgment. In the present experiment we investigated whether this finding could be replicated and whether it could be reasonably attributed to causality or might be attributed alternatively to the single event probabilities, as has been suggested by Yates and Carlson (1986).120 subjects read short texts each describing two diseases. These texts varied with respect to the probability of disease A and the probability of disease B (high or low), and the causal relation between the two diseases (yes or no). Ss judged the conjunctive probabilities that a person suffered from both diseases. Causality showed neither an effect upon the judged probability of conjunctions nor upon the frequency of conjunction fallacies. The single event probabilities, on the other hand, had significant effects: conjunction fallacies occured most often when the text included a combination of high and low event probability. Our results support the assumption that (a) causality is not sufficient to induce the conjunction fallacy, and (b) single event probabilities have a major influence on conjunctive probability judgments. The mental model approach is suggested as a theoretical framework that might allow the integrative and systematic examination of causal reasoning pr

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960030106

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960030101

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY