摘要:

AbstractIn this paper I explore a justification for transcendental idealism that emerges from the dialogue with philosophical scepticism in which Kant is on and off engaged throughout the Critique of Pure Reason.1Many commentators, most prominently Strawson, have claimed that transcend‐ ental idealism is an unfortunate addition to the Critique, one that can profitably be excised in the interests of clarity and coherence.2Against this general picture I urge that transcendental idealism is in fact a very natural consequence of some of the central doctrines of the Critical Philosophy. It is in the context of Kant's debate with scepticism that this emerges most clearly. Nonetheless, I argue that Kant's employment of transcendental idealism against the sceptic is seriously compromised by his postulating the existence of unknowable things‐in‐themselves. As long as he maintains that there are unknowable things‐in‐themselves which are responsible for our having the experience that we do have, his position seems to collapse into sceptical idealism. In the final section of the paper I suggest that the only possible escape from this difficulty would be to rule out the possibility of affirming that unknowable things‐in‐themselves exist. I also suggest that an argument to this effect exists in the Critique and that Kant's position would be more consistent had he

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00066.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe paper questions the common assumption that rational individuals believe all propositions which they know to be logical consequences of their other beliefs: although we must acknowledge the truth of a proposition which is a deductive consequence of our beliefs, we may not genuinelybelieveit. This conclusion is defended by arguing that some familiar counterexamples to the claim that knowledge is justified true belief fail because they involve propositions which are not really believed. Beliefs guide conduct or issue in assertion by answering questions which arise in the course of deliberation and conversation, but the troublesome cases present propositions which do not present the agent's answer to any question. The paper concludes by sketching the conditions under which the deductive consequences of our beliefs can be believed.1

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00067.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn this paper I aim to make sense of our pre‐theoretic intuitions about dispositions by presenting an argument for the identity of a disposition with its putative categorical base. The various possible ontologies for dispositions are outlined. The possibility of an empirical proof of identity is dismissed. Instead ana prioriargument for identity is adapted from arguments in the philosophy of mind. I argue that dispositions occupy, by analytic necessity, the same causal roles that categorical bases occupy contingently and that properties with identical causal roles are identical. The validity of the argument depends upon the possibility of overdetermination of disposition manifestations being rejected. ‘Ungrounded dispositions’ are dismissed as not genuine dispositions. Identity conditions for dispositions and categorical bases are out

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00068.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractWhat can be inferred from the fact that something is, or is not, conceivable? In this paper I argue, contrary to some deflationary remarks in recent literature, that arguments which use such facts as their starting point may have significant philosophical import. I use Strawson's results from the first chapter ofIndividualsin order to show that Galileo's arguments in favour of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which are based on premises concerning conceivability, should not be dismissed: they are the first step towards recognising an important conceptual truth.

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00069.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractTo undermine much of what we ordinarily claim to know, sceptics have often appealed to a principle (known as the principle of closure) according to which knowledge (justification) is closed under known entailment. In this paper after expounding the views of Stein, Klein and others, I shall argue that they all fail to take note of different contexts in which the principle of closure is applied. The relevance of the principle of closure for scepticism is then analyzed in the light of, what I call, the ‘infectious’ character of epistemic contexts. I shall also highlight the similarities in the behaviour of the concepts of justification and confirmation and appeal to certain solutions to the paradoxes of confirmation to provide a comprehensive account of the different instances of the principle of clos

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00070.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn the first section the problem of political obligation is motivated, and in Section 2 the core structure of the problem is laid bare. A recognition of this structure prompts reflection that the problem will appear very different to different thinkers, depending on their moral theories. It also invites the speculation that the problem will be incapable of solution on some moral theories while trivial on others. This polarity does reflect the state of much of the literature until fairly recently. However this picture is seen to be too crude, and in the third section it is shown how an interesting solution has been proposed by advocates of the ‘theory of fairness’. In Section 4 this theory is evaluated, concentrating particularly on George Klosko's version, which is, in part, rejected. However it is argued that no version of the theory is able to guarantee universal political obligations. In Section 5 it is argued that this is an unnoticed advantage of the theory, for it may well be that, morally at least, we should allow those who do not benefit from the existence of the state to escape political obligations. The consequences of this view are examined and found not to be as threatening as they might first have appea

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00071.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00072.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book Reveiwed in this article:David Owens,Causes and Coincidences

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00073.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY