摘要:

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that a satisfactory account of consciousness will involve both (1) local indeterminism, in that some relevant events are not wholly and unequivocally pre‐determined by immediately prior local events, and (2) nonlocality, in that, within the leeways left by local indeterminism, what happens can be immediately affected by spatially separated or extended events. I briefly consider if this can be avoided by treating consciousness as supervenient and epiphenomenal; and I suggest that current theories of consciousness break down through failure to incorporate local indeterminism and nonlocality. I conclude by outlining possible implications for freedom of the will, physicalism, and the relevance of quantum mechanics to consciousnes

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00089.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractAccording to Spinoza mental events and physical events are identical. What makes Spinoza's identity theory tempting is that it solves the problem of mind body interaction rather elegantly: mental events and physical events can be causally related to each other because mental events are physical events.However, Spinoza seems to deny that there is any causal interaction between mental and physical events. My aim is to show that Spinoza's apparent denial of mind body interaction can be reconciled with the identity theory. I argue that Spinoza had both an extensional and an intensional concept of cause and when Spinoza seems to deny mind body interaction he is having in mind the intensional concept of cause. This intensional concept of cause corresponds to that of causal explanation. I will argue that Spinoza anticipated Donald Davidson's view that even though mental events cannot be explained by referring to physical events andvice versa, mental and physical events are causally related to each other.

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00090.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractInConfrontations with the ReaperFred Feldman puts forward puts forward an ethical theory called ‘justicized act utilitarianism’, JAU, according to which an act is morally right if and only if it maximizes universal justice level, i.e., brings it about that as many as possible get what they deserve. It is here argued that JAU is exposed to objections under the force of which it either loses its special emphasis on justice or its utilitarian character. It is also contended that, contrary to what Feldman suggests, JAU does not deal more plausibly with procreation and abortion than do more familiar forms of utilitarianism. Rather, it deals less plausibly at least with abortion, due to difficulties in the concept of des

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00091.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractTwo uses of ‘if are discussed which do not involve conditions. The first is illustrated in the example ‘If he's here, I don't see him’, the second in ‘He's not a dunce, if a trifle stupid’. A third non‐conditional use, cognate with the first is also mentioned: it would be illustrated in the example ‘If he's a Dutchman, I'll eat my hat’. It is argued that recent attempts to formulate a logic of conditionals have distorted our understanding of ‘if, by ignoring these uses, sometimes deliberately. Specifically, as a result, many arguments involving ‘if have been misjudged as invalid, because the expectation has been that ‘if expresses a condition. It is suggested that the traditional analysis of ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ in terms of ‘if and only if, is partly to blame for these misunderstandings. And the proper understanding of ‘if’ which emerges shows it is quite fully capture

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00092.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractArthur Danto inThe Transfiguration of the Commonplaceand Richard Wollheim inPainting as an Arthave each advanced a certain meaning theory of art (MT), more specifically, a theory according to which something is a work of art just in case it expresses a proposition. The first part of this essay sets out that view in more detail, with textual support that Danto and Wollheim do in fact hold that theory. The second part offers reasons against accepting MT. (1) There seem to be persuasive counterexamples to MT: objects that are clearly works of art but which do not appear to exhibit any tendency towards propositionality. (2) Neither theorist provides an explanation as to why someone with something to say would choose to, as it were, hide his thought behind a painting. (3) MT will force a theory of the evaluation of art that parallels the evaluation of (say) scientific or philosophical thought. Artworks will be judged according to the profundity of the thoughts they express rather than by their aesthetic features – which would make Duchamp a greater artist than Mone

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00093.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractI characterise a relativist account of truth as one according to which the truth value of a sentence can vary without its meaning changing. Relativism is to be contrasted with absolutism, which states that the truth values of sentences cannot change, so long as their meanings remain constant. I argue that absolutism follows from the realist account of meaning and truth conditions. According to realism, the meaning of a sentence consists in objective truth conditions and sentences are true if and only if certain objective conditions obtain. Relativism is a consequence of anti‐realism. Anti‐realists believe that the meanings of sentences consist in recognisable conditions and that sentences are true if and only if certain recognisable conditions obtain. I contrast the sorts of relativism which results from partial, empiricism‐based anti‐realisms, and global anti‐realism, which is linked to a coherence theory of knowledge. I offer a few remarks on how global anti‐realists can restrict the scope of their

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00094.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00095.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00096.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book Reveiwed in this article:Elizabeth Anderson,Value in Ethics and Economics

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00097.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00098.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY