摘要:

AbstractThe topic under examination is the idea of ‘supervenient dualism’, which Christopher Shields first put forward in his study of Aristotle's theory of psychology. Shields takes supervenient dualism to be a form of ‘substance supervenience’, in which an immaterial substance supervenes upon a material or physical substance. Shields, however, does not develop a convincing version of supervenient dualism because he fails to develop a convincing version of substance supervenience. A plausible version of substance supervenience can be developed in the light of Jaegwon Kim's idea of ‘multiple‐domain supervenience’, although this version of substance supervenience is not able to provide the basis for an adequate formulation of supervenient dualism. The nature of this version of substance supervenience depends upon a relation of coordination between the substances, and there does not seem to be any relation of coordination that yields a form of substance supervenience that also counts as a form of superve

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00149.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper makes a connection between some developments in game theory and issues about everyday psychological knowledge. I argue that there are two‐person situations in which agents will do badly if they use a particular simple theory of rationality to predict one another's actions. If we assume that our everyday techniques for anticipating one another's actions will get better results than this, it follows that these techniques do not consist in applying a theory like this one. One alternative is that when we anticipate actions we supplement whatever theories we have with a capacity to imagine the other person's motivation. I sketch a way of modelling this capacity

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00150.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe paper begins by distinguishing between two ways of effecting the dissolution of a philosophical problem: reductive and philosophical. Of these, the former holds out deflationary prospects greater than those of the latter. Attention focuses specifically on McGinn's proposed dissolution of the mind‐body problem. Examination of his argument reveals that his naturalist dissolution involves traditional non‐naturalist constraints, in a way that counts against his deflationary conclusions. At best his treatment constitutes a philosophical, rather than a reductive dissolution. But there is reason to think that it might in fact constitute a mere relocation of what is, essentially, the same problem that it set out to disso

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00151.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe popular idea that mental calculation involves covert operations as counterparts to the scribblings, sayings or manipulations involved in classroom calculation is rejected by familiar arguments in Section I. Philosophers do not readily agree on an alternative account. Section II considers reasons why they are puzzled, reasons which encourage a return to the discredited position. The currently fashionable Causal or Functionalist view is criticised in Section III. Section IV reconsiders the stubborn fact that when someone calculates in their head they do something at the time which explains their arithmetical successes or failures. Some dispositional descriptions are rejected as inadequate. Though a restrained dispositionalism is finally supported, it does not have the implication that nothing was going on in the silence.

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00152.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractDescartes's view that the eternal truths of mathematics and logic have been established by God and depend on his will does not merely commit him (as some commentators have suggested) to denying that such truths are necessarily necessary; it abolishes their necessity altogether. For similar reasons, some contemporary views also unwittingly abolish necessity.

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00153.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn this paper, I assess Dickie's institutional theory of art. I compare the earlier and later forms of the theory, and I point to various problems of detail with these accounts. I then proceed by arguing that Dickie's definition excludes Krispy Kreme doughnut boxes from possessing the status of being works of art, and it excludes those who made them from possessing the status of being artists. The intention is not to offer a counter example to Dickie's account. Rather, the complaint is that there could be no philosophical point or interest in a concept of art which excludes these doughnut boxes. The best way to see this is by contrast with a concept of art that includes them. Thus I outline what I call a ‘creative’ account. What we want is a concept of art which helps us understand a certain phenomenon in the world – the phenomenon that we call ‘art’. In this light, I argue that Dickie's institutional theory tells us nothing about why people want to make art and nothing about why they want to experience it. By contrast, the creative theory, which embraces both doughnut boxes and things in galleries, is more ex

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00154.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00155.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book Reviews in this Article:Robert Nozick,The Nature of Rationality

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00156.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00157.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY