ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060102

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractMechanicism and organicism (vitalism) are two basic positions in the study of life processes. They can be reduced in a simplifying manner to a scheme Demokritos‐mechanism‐causality and Aristotle‐organism‐finality. The essentially mechanistic thought of the enlightenment lost all its influence in Germany through the speculative tendencies of natural philosophy. For the physiology between 1780 and 1840 physics and chemistry became only auxiliary sciences applicable to some special problems (Merkel, Rudolphi, Tiedemann, Johannes Müller). In the middle of the 19th century ‐ after remarkable attempts of the brothers Weber (1825, 1827) ‐ comes a complete change in the direction of physico‐mechanistic research. The first representative textbook of a quantitative‐measuring physiology is that of G. G. Valentin (1844). Decisive for the development of modern physiological science is the discovery of the laws of thermodynamics (Mayer, Joule, Helmholtz, Clausius, Boltzmann) demonstrating the same forces acting in organic and inorganic processes. The transformation of physiology into a physico‐mechanistic science is due in the first instance to du Bois‐Reymond, Ludwig, Brücke and Helmholtz who formulated the new program and controbuted by their results so that physiology would be recognized as an exact natural science. The intellectual situation in France (Dutrochet, Poiseuille, Claude Bernard) can be parallelised. The „biological philosophy”︁ of A. Comte, however, demands peculiar attention. The next generation (L. Hermann, R. Heidenhain, A. Fick, J. Bernstein) helps to consolidate modern physiology, which incorporates physical chemistry (1887) as its most recent branch. The mechanistic necessity leads namely A. Fick and H. Helmholtz to a new philosophical understanding of physical reality. The contribution of the 19th century to mechanize the experimental life sciences made from physiology an autonomous science no longer directed by pure utility and which escaped fr

ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060103

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractKant is often incorrectly regarded as the father of objective mechanism, a theory of ontological realism in the 19th and 20th century. Nietzsche raised the objection that the notion of causality has its origin in the self‐experience of subjects ‐ so objectivity could not be claimed for mechanism at all. Physics as well as metaphysics isinterpretation, not explanation of the world. Hegel likewise asserts the theoretical impregnance of „facts”︁, but here the difference between concept and thing is one which calls for its surmounting. Mechanism is one step in the development of the absolute idea; it is a necessary category, but, taken as the absolute, in itself contradictory. Ultimately the interpretation of nature is grounded in the way mankind wants to understand itself: as free or as

ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060104

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060105

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractSchopenhauer versteht seine Philosophie als immanente Metaphysik, deren a priori gewonnene Resultate empirisch bestätigt werden können. Vor allem in der SchriftÜber den Willen in der Naturgeht es Schopenhauer um den Nachweis, daß die lebenswissenschaftliche Forschung seiner Zeit eine Fülle von Daten geliefert hat, die auf empirischer Basis eine Bestätigung der Lebenskraftmetaphysik erbringen. Dies wird in den Hauptlinien ausgeführt.In einem Anhang wird ein Überblick über die Literatur gegeben, die sich mit Schopenhauers Verhältnis zur Biolog

ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060106

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractDie engen Verbindungen zwischen Natur‐ und Geschichtswissenschaft in der Zeit der Aufklärung haben sich im 19. Jahrhundert gelockert. Die meisten Historiker seitdem verfügen über eine gute Grundausbildung in der Philologie, teilweise auch in der Jurisprudenz, besitzen aber keine vergleichbare Grundkenntnis der Naturwissenschaften. Dennoch gibt es im 19. Jahrhundert drei Versuche, Geschichtswissenschaft nach dem Vorbild der Naturwissenschaft zu betreiben. 1. In der marxistischen Historiographie werden ökonomische und soziale Prozesse in enger Analogie zu Naturvorgängen, als „naturwüchsig”︁ gesehen. 2. Darwinistische Autoren betrachten menschliches Verhalten als weitgehend durch biologische Faktoren determiniert. 3. Die sogenannten Positivisten (zum Beispiel Thomas Buckle) benutzen Statistiken und mathematische Modelle in ihren historischen Schriften. Mehrere Jahrzehnte wurden derartige Ansätze durch traditionelle (historistische) Historiker zurückgewiesen (so von Gustav Droysen) mit dem Argument, daß die Historie eine Wissenschaftsui generis sei. Schließlich aber wurden positivistische Elemente in den Historismus aufgenommen. Max Weber vor allem hat gezeigt, bis zu welchem Ausmaß historisches Verständnis sich auf Idealtypen und Regelmäßigkeiten im Ereignisverlauf stützen kann. Auf der anderen Seite betonen neuerdings Naturwissenschaftler die Rolle solcher Elemente in ihren Disziplinen, die bisher als Kennzeichen der Geisteswissenschaften gegolten haben: den Einfluß subjektiver Faktoren auf wissenschaftliche Befunde und die Bedeutung von statistischen Wahrscheinlichkeiten anstelle strin

ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060107

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractA central problem for legal thinkers of the 19thcentury was the question, whether the treatment of the law could be conceived as a scientific activity in the true sense of the word. According to the criteria which had been proposed by Kant with regard to the natural sciences, different answers seemed to be possible. G. Hugo argued that material given by experience could not be subject of an „exact science”︁. P. J. A. Feuerbach on the contrary advocated a concept of legal thinking, in which the method of physics served as a model. These two positions indicate a certain lack of self‐confidence, as a foreign standard is accepted in determining the status of the own discipline. This situation can also be interpreted as indicator for a feeling of crisis prevailing from now on in the self‐assessment of jurisprudential activity. On this background it is possible to explain many arguments and theories in the field of jurisprudence, when the corresponding counterpoint in one of the natural sciences is taken into consideration. A characteristic example is the way, in which F. K. v. Savigny has been shaping his „organic”︁ theory of specific legal correlations according to the physiological way of analysis proposed by C. C. E. Schmid. Even a statement like the one of J. H. v. Kirchmann, in which legal activity is denied any scientific value, has to be understood in this context. For Kirchmann takes the natural sciences as uncontested scientific model and accepts in this way the parameters of evaluation set by jurists like Hugo, Feuerbach and Savigny. It has still to be evaluated, whether this stream of theory led to a „turning point”︁ in the development of 19thcentury legal thinking, as J. E. Kuntze put it in 1856. But already now it can be stated that the close contact between Kuntze and G. Th. Fechner has been contributing to a diagnostic sensitivity on the part of Kuntze, which makes him an observer of special insight. Thus it may well be that the considerations sketched here have been introducing a leading theme into the following theoretical discussions in the field of jurisprudence during the second half of the 19thcentury. This question deserves further inter

ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060108

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractDuring the second half of 19thcentury, psychiatry developped into a natural science as a part of medicine. Towards the end of the century, the medical model of mental illness got into a crisis which led to a restriction of somatopathological explanation of psychopathological phenomena, an accentuation of empirical and psychological description of the clinical facts, and a reception of phenomenology and psychoanalysis into psychiatry. Thus, the idea of mental illness as an etio‐pathogenetical and symptomatical unit, based on a cerebral alteration or process, has been given up in favour of clinical types or syndroms of mental disorder without a close connexion with an organic substratum. In consequence of these trends, the modern pluralistic concept of mental illness has been establishe

ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060109

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060110

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe contributions of the great physicist Ludwig Boltzmann to philosophy and biology are not known sufficiently. In philosophy, he was a realist, and much opposed to his colleague's, Mach's, positivism, but also to Berkeley's, Kant's, Hegel's and Schopenhauer's idealisms. In biology, Boltzmann was a passionate Darwinist and tried to explain on the basis of evolution the meaning of photosynthesis as well as the origin of life and of the mind. Boltzmann argued for evolutionary epistemology. Opposing Kant, he derived the fundamental ideas of space, time and causality from the experience of mankind and its ancestors. The laws of thought were acquired in evolution. While they must be broadly true they need not be faultless. Antinomies arise when thought overshoots the mark,i. e.exceeds the limits of the area for which it evolved. As for Boltzmann the experience of the organism in the course of evolution is the only and exclusive source of knowledge, he may be called an absolute Darwinist. A short account of Boltzmann's Darwinian ideas on the origin of morality, on the sense of beauty and on happiness is also given.

ISSN:0170-6233    

DOI:10.1002/bewi.19830060111

出版商:WILEY‐VCH Verlag    

年代:1983

数据来源: WILEY