ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150901

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractStrategy implementation scholars have traditionally focused their attention on behavioral and social phenomenc in a firm that enable it to both choose and implement its strategies. Unfortunately, some of this work has assumed that it is possible to study strategy implementation independent of the content of a firm's strategies, and independent of the particular competitive context within which a firm operates. Recent developments in the resource‐based view of the firm reaffirm the importance of studying the strategic consequences of behavioral and social phenomena within a firm, but suggest that separating this work from the content of strategy, or from the competitive context of a firm, is inappropriate. The papers in this special issue focus on important behavioral and social phenomena in a firm (e.g., organizational behavior), but do so in an explicit competitive context (e.g., competitiveorganizational behavior

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150902

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractOrganizations vary in how well they perform. This can be due to differences in their strategic positions and to differences in their competitive abilities. We propose an evolutionary model in which there is a trade‐off between these two sources of advantage. In a naive evolutionary model, competition triggers both selection and learning–leaving organizations with the capabilities to perform better. However, managers often buffer their organizations from the disciplining forces of selection by seeking out positional advantages in the market. We argue that when this is done using multiunit structures, market position improves but organizational learning is retarded. Consistent with this view, we find that after controlling for selection, single‐unit organizations benefit today from being exposed historically to competition–evidence of learning–while large, multiunit organizations do not. Multiunit organizations instead benefit from mutual forbearance, a positional advantage. The findings come from a dynamic analysis of takeovers and performance among retail banks in Illinois. Implications for the study of strategic evolution are

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150903

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractDespite widespread agreement among organizational researchers that intangible resources underlie performance differences among organizations, little empirical evidence exists in the literature. Building on the idea that reputation is socially constructed, this paper depicts reputation as the outcome of the process of legitimation. It observes that organizational researchers have overlooked how certification contests legitimate organizations, generate status orderings, and create favorable reputations. This paper suggests that victories in certification contests are credentials that enable firms to acquire a reputation for competence. It predicts that cumulative victories improve the survival of organizations and better the life chances of startup organizations more than those of lateral entries. These predictions are analyzed in the American auto industry during 1895–1912 when special‐purpose product rating agencies were absent and reliability and speed contests served as credentialing devices. The results show that cumulative victories in contests extend the life chances of winning organizations but there is no evidence that new startup organizations benefit more than lateral entries. These findings underscore the significance of intangible assets and point to the need for an institutionally informed theory of competen

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150904

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe resource view of the firm has made substantial progress in identifying what attributes of a firm may provide a source of competitive advantage; however, the literature has far less to say about the emergence of these distinctive capabilities. We develop a simple framework based on the role of positive feedback effects of market activity, organizational factors that cause a firm to focus on a particular capability trajectory, and lastly the role of managerial choice with respect to anticipated feedback effects, which we term feedforward effects. We apply this framework to the emergence of competitive positions in the mutual fund‐processing business from its inception to 198

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150905

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractRenewed interest in the resource‐based theory of the firm has focused attention on the role of heterogeneous organizational ‘competence’ in competition. This paper attempts to measure the importance of these effects in the context of pharmaceutical research. We distinguish between ‘component’ and ‘architectural’ competence, and using internal firm data at the program level from 10 major pharmaceutical companies show that together the two forms of competence appear to explain a significant fraction of the variance in research productivity across firms. Our results raise some intriguing questions about the nature of competencies and the ways in which they diff

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150906

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper uses data on 23 process development projects in pharmaceuticals to explore the broader issue of how organizations create, implement, and replicate new routines. A framework is presented which links approaches to experimentation and the structure of underlying knowledge. Although the concept of learning‐by‐doing is well accepted in the literature, the framework here suggests that where underlying scientific knowledge is sufficiently strong, effective learning may take place outside the final use environment in laboratories (i.e., ‘learning‐before‐doing’). This proposition is tested by comparing how an emphasis on laboratory experimentation impacts process development lead times in two different technological environments: traditional chemical‐based pharmaceuticals and new biotechnology‐based pharmaceuticals. The data indicate that in chemical‐based pharmaceuticals—an environment characterized by deep theoretical and practical knowledge of the process technology—more emphasis on laboratory experimentation (learning‐before‐doing) is associated with more rapid development. In contrast, in biotechnology‐based pharmaceuticals—an environment in which process technology is often characterized as being more of an ‘art’ than a science—a greater emphasis on laboratory experimentation does not seem to shorten process development lead times. These results suggest that there is no one best way to learn, but that different approaches may be required

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150907

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractWe study coordination games with multiple equilibria, in which players are penalized for picking numbers higher than the minimum anybody picks, and everyone prefers a larger minimum. ‘Weakest‐link games like this model organizational situations in which the worst component of a product or process determines its overall quality. In experimental groups, the best equilibrium was reached infrequently. Aggregating two groups into a larger one always hurt. We argue that players’ beliefs about what the minimum will be are an ‘expectational asset’ (or liability) which is socially complex, linking organization‐level behavior and the resource‐based vie

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150908

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractRecent research and public discourse on executive compensation and corporate governance suggests a growing consensus that firms can and should increase their control over top managers by increasing the use of managerial incentives and monitoring by boards of directors. This study departs from this consensus by offering an alternative perspective that considers not only the benefits, but also the costs of both incentives and monitoring in large corporations. The study develops and tests a contingency cost/benefit perspective on governance decisions as resource allocation decisions, proposing how and why the observed levels of managerial incentives and monitoring may vary across organizations and across time. Specifically, the study suggests that: (1) firms that are more risky face greater costs when using incentive compensation contracts for top managers, thus reducing the expected level of incentive compensation use for such firms; (2) firms facing this problem of low incentive compensation use can realize greater benefits from higher levels of board monitoring, and thus are likely to rely more on board monitoring; and (3) firms with more complex comporate strategies face higher costs in using board monitoring, and are thus likely to rely less on board monitoring as a source of controlling top management behavior. The study also proposes that within this contingency perspective there may be diminishing ‘behavioral returns’ to increases in monitoring and incentives. These hypotheses are tested using extensive longitudinal data from over 400 of the largest U.S. corporations. The supportive findings suggest that maximal levels of incentives and monitoring are not necessarily optimal, and that a firm's strategy may not only have significant product/market implications, but also corporate governance implicati

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150909

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractOrganizational capabilities, appropriately defined, can meet the conditions, articulated by the resource‐based view of the firm, for being a source of sustainable competitive advantage. However, this paper observes that there are limits to the extent of the importance of such capabilities. They are vulnerable to threats of erosion, substitution, and above all to being superseded by a higher‐order capability of the ‘learning to learn’ variety. This suggests that there can be an infinite regress in the explanation for, and prediction of, sustainable competitive advantage. The problem is resolved by arguing that the value of organizational capabilities is context dependent, and by recognizing that the strategy field will never find the ultimate source of sustainable competitive ad

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250150910

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY