摘要:

Abstract.Legal philosophy must consider the way in which laws function as reasons for action. “Simple positivism” considers laws as merely reasons in the balance of reasons. Joseph Raz, as a representative of “sophisticated positivism,” argues that laws are exclusionary reasons for action, not merely reasons in the balance of reasons. This paper discusses Raz's arguments for his view. The Functional Argument provides no more reason for positivism than against it. The Phenomenological Argument is best supported by an account of how character traits function in explaining behaviour. But then the distinction between exclusionary reasons and expressive reasons is obliterated. Legal positivism cannot absorb laws as expressive reasons for action. Raz's positivism implies the correctness of an anti‐positivistic leg

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00109.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.Although the Hart/Dworkin debate has as much to do with Dworkin's affirmative theory of judicial discretion as with Hart's more comprehensive theory of law, the starting point was of course Dworkin's attempt to demolish the “model of rules,” Hart's alleged analysis of legal systems as collections of conclusive reasons for specified legal consequences. The continuing relevance of this attack for the prospects for any theory of law is the subject of the present es

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00110.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.This article focuses on a critical interpretation of the work of Unger. It is argued that Unger's view is less revolutionary than he depicts it and that American law often develops as Unger describes it, though this is absolutely no revolution. The authors further show what the possibilities and the limits of a transformative vocation at the bar can be.

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00111.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.In the debates about legal determinacy, an important but often neglected issue is what is meant in the legal context by saying that a question has a right answer. By way of a critique of A. D. Woozley's discussion of “right answers,” I try to show how this issue is connected with issues of legal truth, legal mistake, and preced

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00112.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.Klaus Günther's (1988) book developed the distinction between two kinds of discourse, the foundation discourse and the application discourse. In an article (Günther 1989a) following the publication of the book, he used this basic distinction as the starting point for a criticism of the special case‐thesis as defended by Robert Alexy (1978, 32ff., 263ff.; Alexy 1989, 16ff., 213ff.). The aim of this article is to criticize this criticism in its turn and to show that the special case‐thesis does not need the reformulation which Günther proposes. It should be clear from the outset that this concerns an internal discussion in the field of discourse theory; certain discourse‐theoretical premises are taken for granted. In order to understand Giinther's criticism I will first give a brief account of the distinction he

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00113.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.This article is written with a view to clarifying the following points: First, to understand the nature of possession, its origin must be kept in mind. Possession is not a legal invention, it is a pre‐legal fact. Second, possession whether in law or in common sense is ade factocontrol. There is no difference between possession in law and possession in fact. Third, different types of rules and policies of law to deal with possession, do not change the contents of possession. They merely represent the situations in which possession is found under different circumstance

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00114.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00115.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00116.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00117.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00118.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY