摘要:

ABSTRACTThis paper uses the case of telecommunications deregulation to construct a model of interest group behavior in bureaucratic‐legislative policymaking. The model posits three common policymaking arenas: closed, open, and the transformational period between the two. Three features of these policymaking arenas are explored: (1) changes in the numbers of interested actors, leading to (2) changes in the policy‐making environment and to (3) the shifting strategic interests of actors. Borrowing the concepts of “voice” and “exit” from Hirschman (1970), alternative interest group strategies are found to occur in different policymaking environments, or arenas, which in turn depend in significant part on the numbers of interested actors involved. Voice works when interests are or appear to be relatively complementary. Exit is used when voice fails, that is, in permeable arenas of many actors with conflictin

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00319.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIn this paper the transactions cost approach (TCA) is used to define organizations and to predict their forms under certain conditions. Next, Aaron Wildavsky's approach is used to define the policy process and to predict its form in particular organizations. Two assertions follow: namely, that the most efficient organizational form may be predicted from knowledge of underlying transactions costs, and that the form of the policy process in an organization can be predicted from knowledge of the organization's form (regardless of whether it is the most efficient form). Recent natural gas policy in the U.S.A. is used to illustrate these propositions, and several conclusions are offered about 1) the potential applicability of the TCA to the public sector and to the policy process and 2) about the potential applicability of Wildavsky's version of the policy process to differing organizational forms.

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00320.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00321.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00322.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe Sagebrush Rebellion began in the late 1970s with the objective of transferring various categories of federally owned lands to the states. The movement was centered in western “public lands” states, where nearly half the total land area is in federal ownership. Within a relatively short period of time this objective was changed to one of “privatizing” federal lands, of selling these land into private ownership. While the Sagebrush Rebellion has been highly political in its activities, the movement can be viewed in the perspective of historical land disposition policies in the U.S. These policies were changed near the turn of the century from alienating public lands into private ownership to their retention and management by the federal government.Confusion over the economics of building a free enterprise system based on private property rights, and the costs associated with building such as system, appear to have been major factors in changing land policies. Two important aras in which this occurred were the Homestead Act of 1862 and timber. The provisions of the Homestead Act imposed heavy costs on settlers, and these costs caused a reaction against the economic system that was bein

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00323.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTAdvocates of “privatization” argue that the sale of public lands to private owners would significantly improve the management of natural resources. Experience from the first round of land sales suggests that the government, responding to the politics of the Sagebrush Rebellion, will continue to subsidize preferred uses of “privatized” lands through give–aways, below–par purchases, preference sales, and imperfect sales. Even though the federal government may go ahead with the land sales program, political compromises will not allow the free market goals of privatization to

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00324.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTEscalating legal confrontations between private enterprise and government over land use controls are raising the costs of land development and slowly eliminating the potentials for reasonably priced family housing. Equally important, these confrontations are beginning to have more and more of the negative aspects of public utility control processes without any of the associated benefits. Now would seem to be an ideal time in which to review the “public utility” approach to land use controls since it can offer many more benefits than current control systems, while balancing society concerns and private developers' fair return objecti

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00325.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe state has the power both to enable local communities to regulate land usage, as well as to override local jurisdictions' zoning policies. In Massachusetts, two pieces of legislation have empowered the state to override local land use control for the purpose of constructing two types of facilities: low and moderte income housing and hazardous waste treatment facilities. Both initiatives have stimulated considerable debate and controversy. This paper provides a framework or “test” for understanding the relative appropriateness of state overrides in general. In addition, the two Massachusetts case are discussed and analyzed according to these crite

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00326.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTStates and towns are increasingly using a new impact analysis technique (one that shows many of the virtues and vices of impact planning generally): fiscal impact analysis. In a recent celebrated case in Vermont, the Pyramid Mall case, in which a shopping center was refused a development permit under “Act 250”, Vermont's state–wide land use law, heavy use was made of fiscal impact analyses. This case raised serious issues about the financial and technical capability of the state – indeed any state – to administer fiscal impact analysis, and about the adequacy of the law to properly guide the use of impact analysis. The central question running throughout the Pyramid Mall case and the use of fiscal impact analyses in that case is whether the administration of land use controls pursuant to fiscal impact analysis is improper government control of competition. The Pyramid Mall case offers an illustration of the effort to control both competition among private units and competition among municipalities; a study of the case reveals the extent to which the effort is effective, optimal, and equitable. The inadequacy of the Vermont laws enabling fiscal impact analysis emerges, and the shallowness of existing judicial review of fiscal impact analysis becomes evident. Guidelines for a proper legal approach to fiscal impact analysis are suggested and alternative mechanisms of review are

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00327.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTImpact fees are an increasingly popular way for local governments to raise money for new capital facilities. The legal basis for the imposition of these fees, however, is unsettled. This paper considers some of the fundamental questions that must be resolved concerning the legality of impact fees. The paper concludes that in many instances such fees are unauthorized taxes, not fees incident to the regulatory power local governments possess under the police power. The paper suggests that impact fees should play only a limited role in meeting the fiscal obligations of local governments.

ISSN:0190-292X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1984.tb00328.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY