ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00470.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00471.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00472.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00473.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00474.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe Social Democrats displayed a stronger cohesion than the non‐Socialist parties; the difference in comparison with the Center party, however, was not significant in 1964. The cohesion of the non‐Socialist parties was not significantly different in 1964. In 1966, however, the Conservatives had a stronger cohesion than the middle parties; these two parties did not differ from each other. The Communists had a stronger cohesion than all the other parties.Party cohesion seems to have been intensified from 1964 to 1966. The Communists were, however, an exception; the trend here appears to have been the opposite.On politically important issues, cohesion was subsxantially greater, During divisions on party proposals and government bills the parties closed their ranks. During divisions on a party proposal, members of the party sponsoring the proposal have nearly unanimously supported it.Divisions where sharp splits occurred in a party (225 O/o of the votes against the party line), concerned almost invariable issues of minor significance. Of the few exceptions, one or two had some political importance but did not constitute a major issue of political importance.Issues causing sharp splits ≥ 25 % of the votes against the party line) fall within several policy areas. Among such areas with a relatively high frequency are issues concerning culture, education, youth and traffic.With regard to the cohesion of various subgroups, it can be pointed out: The youngestagegroup (49 years and under) in the different parties often exhibited stronger cohesion than the remaining party members, while, on the contrary, the oldest age group (60 years and over) did not form such cohesive subgroups in the respective parties. Similarly, the MPs with the shortesttenure(those serving their first term) as a rule exhibited a stronger cohesion. On the other hand, MPs with the longest tenure (those serving their fourth term or more) as a rule had a weaker cohesion than the rest of the party. ThewomenMP's cohesion was generally stronger than that of the other members. As far as theChristiangroup is concerned, the Social Democratic members had a stronger cohesion than the remaining Social Democrats. The picture is more varied for the non‐Socialist parties. The Liberal members seem to have been more united, the Conservative and Center party members less united. Members of thetemperancegroups exhibited only in some instances a stronger cohesion.The analysis of the subgroups' voting behavior across party lines sheds additional light on the findings mentioned above. The youngestagegroups and above all the groups with the shortesttenure, in a comparison between the Social Democrats and the non‐Socialist parties, generally had a more dissimilar voting behavior than the older groups and groups with longer tenure. The opposite was true for the Liberals‐Center party. The voting behavior ofwomensubgroups did not differ from that of the complementary groups. The non‐Socialist members of theChristiangroup had a more similar behavior than the other non‐Socialists. As for the Social Democratic members of the Christian group their voting behavior tended to be more dissimilar to that of the non‐Socialist members of the group than was the case for the complementary groups. We obtain a similar picture for thetemperancegroups. The similarity in the voting behavior of the subgroups in the Liberal and Center parties was greater than for the complementary groups. However there was no significant difference for the Soc.—Lib. and Soc.—Cent.2.Party CooperationThe most frequent two‐party‐ combination of joint voting was Soc. + Com.; the most frequent three‐party combination was Cons. + Lib. + Cent. On the other hand, it ought to be stressed that the cases when a strict division between the Socialist and non‐Socialist parties occurred constituted a minority of the total number of divisions. If we exclude the Communists, we find that the Social Democrats voted alone during 43% (1964) and 37% (1966) respectively of the divisions, The Liberals and the Center partyin tootvoted together considerably more times than either did with the Conservatives: 265 times against 214 for the Cons, + Lib. and 193 for the Cons.+Cent. in 1964, and 289 times against 172 for the Cons. + Lib. and 156 for the Cons. + Cent. in 1966. Cooperation between the middle parties increased from 1961 to 1966, while the Conservatives increasingly voted alone. The Liberals were the non‐Socialist party‐ exhibiting the lowest frequency of total joint voting with the Social Democrats, the Center party the highest frequency. The difference between the Liberals and Conservatives, however, is negligible. The Conservatives, relatively more frequently than the middle parties, were the only non‐Socialist party to vote in the same way as the Social Democrats.With respect to non‐Socialist cooperation during the divisions on non‐Socialist party proposals, it can be said: The Conservative party proposals received the support of both the Liberals and the Center parry in about one‐fifth of the cases, and in about three‐fifths of the cases the Conservatives voted alone; this is true for both years. The Liberal party proposals received the support of the Conservatives in about one‐third (1961) and one‐half (1966) respectively of the cases and the support of the Center party in about one‐half and two‐thirds respectively of the cases. The Center party proposals received the support of the Conservatives in about one‐half and one‐fifth of the cases respectively and the support of the Liberals in about three‐fourths and one‐half of the cases respectively, The proposals, initiated by the leaders of the middle parties (1966) received the support of the Conservatives during only 8 of the 25 divisions.As far as the government bills are concerned, there is a very high degree of agreement between the percentages of joint voting on the bills and the corresponding figures for the total number of divisions.The comparisons of the scores of indices of likeness reveal the following: The Social Democrats and Conservatives exhibited during both years a more similar voting behavior than the Social Democrats and Liberals. At the same time the Social Democrats and the Center party had a more similar voting behavior than the Social Democrats and Conservatives. Thus the voting behavior of the Liberals differed most from that of the Social Democrats. The Conservatives in 1964 but not in 1966 were significantly more similar to the Liberals than to the Center party in their voting behavior.The analysis of the joint voting of individual MPs discloses that there are some minor groups, as a rule regional groups, in the parties with a high frequency of voting jointly with a corresp

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00475.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00476.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe results of this study on the voting activity of men and women in Finland, on the election of men and women and on the attitudes and expectations related to this activity are, in general, consistent with those of previous studies and with the propositions set forth in the beginning. Some additions to the facts known earlier can, however, be reported.Apart from the obvious effects of urbanization, of a rise in the socio‐economical level, and of a decrease in religious and conservative traditionalism, some other factors also help to explain small differences in the voting turnout of men and women. For example, in some areas, notably in the Swedish‐speaking rural communes, economic development increases sex differences by bringing with it social disorganization and cross‐pressures. An important result of the ecological analysis was that all over the country past class‐conflicts, traditions of inequality of social classes are reflected in present inequality or difference in sex roles in voting participation. Socialist traditions, which according to Marxian ideology stress the equality of the sexes in political life, and which are strong in the same communes where class conflict and inequality of the sexes prevail, are unable to decrease sex differences when the social structure is characterized by class conflicts.The social and political climates in eastern and western Finland differ remarkably from each other. In eastern Finland women's voting activity is low but a high proportion of women is elected to parliament and municipal councils, notably in the bourgeois parties. This is due to a lack of uniform norms as to whether and for whom to vote. Pressure towards conformity in western Finland brings women to the polls but to vote for men. This shows that women's voting and voting for women are not one‐dimensional phenomena in all social circumstances. On the other hand, it was found that urbanization increases both women's voting and voting for women. — The liberal attitude of men in eastern Finland towards women's participation in politics and leadership, reflects lack of homogeneous conservatism and provides a good foundation for those women who want to be politically active. Women in eastern Finland are not, however, as already mentioned, active as voters but when they are, they of ten vote for women candidates. The east‐west cultural difference seems to be losing importance at present and the south—north or center—periphery difference which is related to economic development, is gaining in importance.The influence of sex role ideologies could be seen primarily in votingforwomen, not that of women. The Marxian principle of the equality of the sexes is reflected in the larger proportion of women among candidates and those elected in the socialist parties. This proportion has for some reason been declining since 1954. On the other hand, voting for women candidates in bourgeois parties has increased. This may be due to the growing number of women working in middle class occupations. Women get votes almost always from other women — only a tiny proportion of men votes for women ‐ and these educated middle‐class women increasingly cast their votes for women candidates. Another reason for the increase in the proportion of votes cast for women in bourgeois parties particularly in towns and cities, may be the radical sex role discussion which began in 1965 and which may have influenced the voting in the elections of 1968 and 1970. This assumption receives support from the sharp increase already in 1966 in votes cast for women in the Swedish People's party, whose supporters included the initiators of this discussion, imported from Sweden.Socio‐economic development, conservative conformity, traditions of equality in the social structure and ideologies concerning equality of the sexes are on the basis of this study some of the factors influencing sex roles in Finnish politics. There is however considerable variation in their importance in different social groups and geographical areas. They also have different effects on the voting turnout of men and women and on the

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00477.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00478.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1970.tb00479.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1970

数据来源: WILEY