摘要:

AbstractThis study examines the relationship between diversification patterns of corporations and their long‐term performance. It is seen that the standard performance measures suggested in corporate finance literature rate all corporations equally in the long run regardless of their diversification strategies. This is because all corporations tend to earn a normal rate of return, given risk, for their shareholders in generally efficient capital markets. Since finance performance measures are not helpful in analyzing corporate performance, use of other measures is suggested for the purpos

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130102

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper examines the role of institutional shareholders in monitoring managers when they propose antitakeover charter amendments (shark repellents). These proposals provide a rare opportunity to examine this issue since they can be adopted only by shareholder approval. We document a positive relationship between the ownership of institutional shareholders and the stock market reaction to the announcement of antitakeover amendments. This finding is consistent with the Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) proposition that large blockholders reduce the free‐rider problem associated with monitoring manager

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130103

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper proposes a model of endogenous shareholder dispersion. We find ownership structure causes variance in firm value, not vice versa, and contra to Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Conditions are also identified where increases in ownership dispersion maximize firm value, contra to Shleifer and Vishny (1986). The model suggests that ownership dispersion is a dynamic phenomenon that may change with interest rates or the set of alternative uses of firm resources. The conclusion is that there is not likely to be one ‘best’ structure of firm ownership, either for an individual firm over time or for all firms at a single point in t

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130104

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractSome economists routinely argue against government regulation that limits the number of mergers and acquisitions. They believe that, as a matter of empirical fact, almost all mergers enhance economic efficiency. The possibility that some mergers do not create wealth but merely redistribute it is ignored. We study all companies delisted from the New York Stock Exchange for reason of merger since 1926. We find that economic efficiency cannot easily explain merger waves. Contrary to the disciplinary hypothesis, acquisition targets are not, in large majority, poor stock market performers. We also report evidence consistent with stock market undervaluation as a merger motive.

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130105

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe impossibility of writing complete contracts causes loss of profitable transactions among firms, since their managers cannotex antebind themselves to future actions. We show how a reallocation of ownership rights into a network of mutual shareholdings among a coalition of firms produces an efficient enforcement mechanism. Co‐operation is achieved by exchanging control rights until a mutual threat of capture of control is established. By making control over their firms vulnerable to a takeover by the other members of the coalition, each firm is able to make a credible commitment to future efficient actions. In equilibrium no punishment is administered, so that the arrangement achieves the outcome under complete contracts. More generally, it is proved that a mutual hostage exchange may dominate the threat of loss of reputation as an enforcement mechanis

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130106

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper presents a model of the agency costs of debt finance, based on the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders. We show how the terms of the compensation contract offered to management by shareholders can reduce these agency costs. We derive a managerial compensation contract that restores the first‐best outcome and leads to a local irrelevance result for financial structure. More generally, the model points out that the nature of managerial compensation contracts will affect the firm's optimal financial structure, and offers a reason why managerial compensation is typically not closely correlated with shareholder return

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130107

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractA sample of large industrial corporations is examined to determine whether there is a relationship between the levels of compensation received by the senior executives of those firms and the firms' economic performances. We find consistent evidence of such a relationship, with differences across firms in the total compensation of their three highest‐paid officers being positively related to differences in both the common stock returns and operating profitability of the firms. The implication is that compensation packages are designed to reduce agency cost

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130108

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractHorizontal shareholding interlocks induce Cournot industries to restrict production. The cartelizing effects of horizontal shareholding interlocks are greater if firms are mindful of indirect shareholding links than if only attentive to direct links. Indirect shareholding exists when a firm A holds stock in B and B holds stock in C. Several algebraic examples of Cournot industries with shareholding interlocks are explored.

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130109

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130110

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130111

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY