ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150102

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractWhen competing retailers lack full information about rivals' decision processes, how will dynamic pricing behavior vary from patterns observed in more traditional static or full‐information models? We investigate this question in a dynamic alternating‐moves duopoly model. Retailers update (linear) conjectures about rivals' future prices in a Bayesian fashion. We show that as observed and expected prices converge, a pricing equilibrium is always achieved, whether or not the conjectured and actual values of the slope of the rival's best response function are consistent. Assuming specific parameter values, we compare equilibrium prices and associated profits in our Bayesian learning model with those obtained under the assumptions of static Nash behavior, collusive behavior and dynamically optimal behavior with full information. We apply the notions of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity to the analysis and find that when products are strategic complements, conjectures of higher rival price responsiveness lead to higher steady‐state prices and profits. The reverse is true for strategic substitutes. We also find that learning about a rival's behavior proceeds more quickly, the less intensely related in demand are products. We find, in general, that equilibrium pricing patterns and profits can vary considerably from those in full‐information environments, but that even with grossly wrong beliefs about rival behavior, competing retailers are still attracted to an equilibrium. The analysis suggests not only the value of investigating lessthan‐full information situations but also the potential incremental value of signalling greater or less aggressiveness than truly characterizes one's behavior as a strateg

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150103

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper analyzes recent changes in the employment relationships between managers and firms. In both Becker's and Lazear's models of firm‐specific wage growth, compensation is deferred from early in an employee's tenure with a firm until later in the contract. The deferred compensation bonds the worker to the firm. Based on cross‐sectional data from Current Population Surveys, rates of firm‐specific wage growth are estimated for the managerial labor market. The findings show that the rate of wage growth that is firm‐specific for managers in manufacturing industries declined significantly during the early 1980s. It is estimated, for example, that a manager with 12 years of tenure in a manufacturing firm enjoyed, on average, a 25% wage premium in 1979 over an otherwise similar manager who was a new hire in a firm. By 1983 the firm‐specific wage premium for a manager with 12 years of tenure was only 5%. These changes represent a significant reduction in the strength of the employment bond between firms and managers, and a reduction in the incentive effects previously enjoyed by firms from the use of deferred‐compensation schemes. This change is consistent with the significant increases in the displacement rates of managers that occurred durin

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150104

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractChanges in the intra‐group linkages affect the ownership of members of the group by their parents and can have different effects on the various objectives of the group. This paper shows how one can use the standard formula for calculating ownership in a group of companies to derive a linear approximation to the marginal changes in the group structure as the result of changes in intra‐group linkages. These marginal effects can be used in linear multi‐objective and/or decentralized planning systems in the group. An example is provided on some tax‐planning effects of marginal changes of intra‐group

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150105

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractProcurement in environments of cost uncertainty and asymmetric information require special arrangements such as the linear incentive contract. Usually the buyer is motivated to make investments that can relieve temporary supplier resource constraints during the procurement. Special problems arise, however, due to interactions between investments in suppliers and the risk‐incentive trade‐off achieved by the incentive contract. A cost signaling model is proposed to overcome these problems, where a supplier offers an equity share in the profit from the incentive contract to the buyer in return for a priori investment. The equity share signals the supplier's private cost information, and forms the basis for the buyer's investment decision. Under equilibrium the buyer can expect to recover the entire amount provided to the supplier through his or her share of the pro

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150106

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractSince the decision on the reported outcome is delegated to the management of the firm, it is commonly held that when the capital market is imperfect the manager achieves consumption smoothing by smoothing the reports relative to the actual outcome. Modeling the firm as a principal‐agent contract shows the contrary. When the capital market is imperfect the firm's reporting strategy is conservative, as the manager never reports more than the actual outcome because of fear of an unfavorable future outcome. When the capital market is perfect the firm either smooths the report‐reports more than the actual outcome when the actual outcome is low and reports less than the actual outcome when the outcome is hig‐or reports more than the actual outcome in order to take advantage of the sharing rule being an increasing function of the r

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150107

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper examines these TVA power distributor issues: distribution of nonelectric utilities, municipal versus co‐operative distributors, effects of high urbanization, marketing and customer recruiting (M&CR), conservation and load management (C&LM) programs, and service area boundary changes. A translog cost model is the basis for the analyses. The conclusions are: (1) TVA distributors experience electrical distribution inefficiencies when they distribute water and electricity, but when they also distribute gas, there are no additional effects; (2) TVA co‐operatives enjoy electrical distribution cost advantages over TVA municipals; (3) the TVA municipals that serve the five largest metropolitan areas of the Tennessee River Valley have the highest electrical distribution costs; (4) M&CR efforts benefit TVA distributors; (5) the many TVA‐sponsored C&LM programs produce varied fiscal effects for TVA distributors; (6) there are both diseconomies and economies to scale given proportional increases in output components brought about by hypothetical increases in TVA distributor service

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150108

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150109

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper presents an exploration of the demand‐side effects of unanticipated price changes. Consumers faced with these changes may have to reoptimize their income allocation. Reoptimization is costly, and reoptimization costs result in kinked demand curves. The existence of such kinked demands provides an additional explanation of the observed nominal price rigidity. In addition, examination of unexpected nominal price changes during inflationary periods provides some justification as to why nominal price adjustments are large, infrequent and almost never downwar

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150110

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090150101

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY