AbstractIn this paper a committee decision-making process of a convex Lagrange decomposable multi-objective optimization problem, which has been decomposed into various subproblems, is studied. Each member of the committee controls only one subproblem and attempts to select the optimal solution of this subproblem most desirable to him, under the assumption that all the constraints of the total problem are satisfied. This procedure leads to a new solution concept of a Lagrange decomposable multi-objective optimization problem, called a preferred equilibrium set. A preferred equilibrium point of a problem, for a committee, may or may not be a Pareto optimal point of this problem. In some cases, a non-Pareto optimal preferred equilibrium point of a problem, for a committee, can be considered as a special type of Pareto optimal point of this problem. This fact leads to a generalization of the Pareto optimality concept in a problem.