Cross‐ownership as a hostage exchange to support collaboration
作者:
Enrico Perotti,
期刊:
Managerial and Decision Economics
(WILEY Available online 1992)
卷期:
Volume 13,
issue 1
页码: 45-54
ISSN:0143-6570
年代: 1992
DOI:10.1002/mde.4090130106
出版商: John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
AbstractThe impossibility of writing complete contracts causes loss of profitable transactions among firms, since their managers cannotex antebind themselves to future actions. We show how a reallocation of ownership rights into a network of mutual shareholdings among a coalition of firms produces an efficient enforcement mechanism. Co‐operation is achieved by exchanging control rights until a mutual threat of capture of control is established. By making control over their firms vulnerable to a takeover by the other members of the coalition, each firm is able to make a credible commitment to future efficient actions. In equilibrium no punishment is administered, so that the arrangement achieves the outcome under complete contracts. More generally, it is proved that a mutual hostage exchange may dominate the threat of loss of reputation as an enforcement mechanis
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