MustSell
作者:
Luías Cabral,
József Sákovics,
期刊:
Journal of Economics&Management Strategy
(WILEY Available online 1995)
卷期:
Volume 4,
issue 1
页码: 55-68
ISSN:1058-6407
年代: 1995
DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00055.x
出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
数据来源: WILEY
摘要:
Why are moving sales a successful and widespread phenomenon? How can it be optimal for a seller to disclose her low valuation for the item to be sold? We propose an explanation based on the “lemons problem” in bargaining with asymmetric information about quality. Disclosing a low valuation signals that there are significant gains from trade, so that trade takes place when it wouldn't otherwise, and all agents are made better
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