MustSell

 

作者: Luías Cabral,   József Sákovics,  

 

期刊: Journal of Economics&Management Strategy  (WILEY Available online 1995)
卷期: Volume 4, issue 1  

页码: 55-68

 

ISSN:1058-6407

 

年代: 1995

 

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00055.x

 

出版商: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

 

数据来源: WILEY

 

摘要:

Why are moving sales a successful and widespread phenomenon? How can it be optimal for a seller to disclose her low valuation for the item to be sold? We propose an explanation based on the “lemons problem” in bargaining with asymmetric information about quality. Disclosing a low valuation signals that there are significant gains from trade, so that trade takes place when it wouldn't otherwise, and all agents are made better

 

点击下载:  PDF (609KB)



返 回