This paper suggests a technique for evaluating threat assessments when reliable data is unavailable. Previously, scholars have found that political leaders manipulated threat assessments to achieve desired defense policy outcomes. Yet contemporary communication about threats are not easily studied, leading some writers to call for new studies of Clausewitz's so‐called “social” dimension of strategy – the efforts by governments to assure domestic support for defense policies. To apply the suggested technique, this paper examines the Reagan Administration's claim that the threats from Soviet strategic defenses justify the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. The Administration's arguments are found to be unclear and internally inconsistent. Despite some fear appeals about Soviet threats, Reagan officials typically noted that American offensive forces will continue to render Soviet defenses impotent and obsolete for the forseeable future. Indeed, vague and inconsistent statements about Soviet forces may have undermined Administration efforts to fulfill SDI funding goals, to codify early deployment plans, and even to establish Manhattan or Apollo‐type policy pr