SummaryThe paper is concerned with the connection between Kant's conception of transcendental schematism and his analysis of the conditions of the possibility of synthetica priorijudgments. After dealing with some of the standard objections to Kant's theory, I argue that transcendental schemata must be construed as pure intuitions. I then point out that thePrinciples of Pure Understandingare a set of synthetica priorijudgments which assert the function of the various schemata as necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, and that each of these judgments involves the relation of a pure concept to pure intuition (as is required by Kant's theory of synthetica priori).Finally, I argue that the connection between a category and its schema must itself be both synthetic anda priori.It therefore requires a “deduction”, which Kant himself does not provide, but which I endeavor, in part, to provide for