The interface between the scientific community on the one hand and the public and its decision makers on the other hand is difficult, particularly where disagreement exists among experts over the alleged scientific “facts”; involved. It is increasingly recognized that our existing institutions are maladaptive to this interface, and several proposals have emerged for improving the means whereby disputed scientific facts are introduced into the public policy decision‐making process. The most prominent of these is the science court which would increase the “presumptive validity of the scientific input”; through a structured adversary proceeding. The science court concept was first proposed in 1967 and formally recommended in a 1976 report of a presidential advisory group. Since that time, the proposal has undergone considerable debate. However, the overall reaction both within and without the scientific community can at best be described as lukewarm. A science court, as such, has not yet been convened and in all likelihood will never be. Nonetheless, the concerns which first gave rise to the proposal are valid and are worthy of examination in the context of an institutionalized science court. To provide background, the article summarizes the court's suggested procedural guidelines and traces its history. To place the science court in better perspective, several other techniques for resolving disputed scientific facts are described. In addition, the debate is summarized over major facets of the proposal as appearing in the open literature. Finally, the one serious attempt to convene a science court is reviewed as a case study in the practical problems associated with its implementation. At question were alleged health and safety effects of a controversial high‐voltage DC transmission line crossing West Central Minnesota, an issue with which the author was heavily involved. The failure of this effort reveals major erroneous assumptions behind the science court proposal and enormous problems with its application. The paper concludes with a recommendation against the science court proposal for several reasons, most of which are related to the basic assumptions initially justifying the concept.