Ethical arguments against the development of behavior therapeutic practices frequently spring from a more generalized moral distrust of behaviorism's emphasis on “control” of human behavior, as well as a disbelief on the part of traditional clinical practitioners that behavioral methods are scientifically capable of meeting the therapeutic challenge. Such criticisms are examined, and found to be based on misinterpretations of the concept of behavioral control or on theoretical formulations of deviancy which are themselves far from established in the light of psychological knowledge.The methodological emphasis on behavior, it is argued, enables the behavior therapist not only to address himself to the experimental development of increasingly powerful techniques of behavior change, but equips him to be more critical of traditional confusions between scientific and moral doctrines, as well as develop a unique moral perception of the deviant individual.Finally, weaknesses in the behavioristic position on methaethical issues are discussed, notably as they pertain to misconstruing the logic of moral discourse or mischaracterizing the relationship between facts and prescriptive rules.